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This thesis consists of 3 essays on competition economics.
The ﬁrst paper develops a model of interaction between strategic sellers with downstream
power and a strategic buyer. Uncertain valuation of the product and imperfect price infor-
mation confer upstream power on the buyer. The price that obtains in collusive equilibrium
exhibits ﬂuctuations, which are a reﬂection of the mechanism used to enforce collusion. An
alternative mechanism by which buyer obtains strategic power against suppliers is charac-
terized.
In the second paper, which is coauthored with Massimo Motta, we estimate, using event
study techniques, the impact of the main events in an antitrust investigation on a ﬁrm’s
stock market value. A surprise inspection at the ﬁrm’s premises has a strong and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s share price, with its cumulative average abnormal return being
approximately 2.1%. Further, we ﬁnd that a negative Decision by the European Commission
results in a cumulative average abnormal return of about 2.4%. Overall, the ﬁne accounts
for approximately a half of this loss in value. Finally, if the Court annuls or reduces the
ﬁne, this has a positive (+2.1%) eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s valuation. The results suggest that
anticompetitive behavior is indeed proﬁtable and that the ﬁnes may not be high enough to
eﬀectively deter ﬁrms from behaving in this way.
The third paper builds a simple model of quantity competition to analyze the eﬀect of
switching costs on equilibrium behavior of two duopolists. Here I characterize an indus-
try structure as a function of initial sales of two ﬁrms. Contrary to the literature, initial
asymmetries persist in this model even though the ﬁrms are identical. When the disparity
between initial sales is large, the smaller ﬁrm may become very aggressive and get more
than half of the market in equilibrium. When the ﬁrms have similar initial positions, they
tend to be locked in them. This paper extends the work on switching costs by considering a
large set of equilibria depending on the initial sales of competing ﬁrms and by characterizing
asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria where asymmetries are persistent.
1
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Buyer Power under Imperfect Price Information and Uncertain
Valuation
1. Introduction
The issue of buyer power has for a long been receiving attention of theorists and reg-
ulators. In the 1930’s the Robinson–Patman Act in the United States sought to prohibit
suppliers from oﬀering preferential terms to selected buyers. This act was a consequence of
a concern that the increased buyer power, with the growth in mass retailing, might impede
the competition in the industry. Recently there has been a renewed attention to this issue.
The reason is that in many industries suppliers are facing buyers with increasing power. One
example where this is particularly true is, according to a study prepared for the European
Commission Consulting (1999), food retailing, where the top ten grocers account for 40% of
sales in Europe. Although less drastically, also other industries have undergone signiﬁcant
consolidations of buyers and increase in their power.
A source of welfare loss related to the buyer power is, according to a standard textbook
treatment, the fact that a monopsonist, buying an intermediate input from a supplier would
buy less than a socially eﬃcient level of this input. Buyer power is particularly undesirable
when the buyer has also power downstream. On the other hand, there is a positive welfare
eﬀect of the buyer power because it can counter the market power of the manufacturers.
Because of these trade–oﬀs, further insights on the nature of the interaction between the
sellers the buyer and downstream ﬁrms are necessary to give a positive judgment on the
structure of the industry.
In view of this natural questions of a regulator would be (1) how to identify a situation in
which a powerful buyer is facing a powerful seller, (2) to what extent the buyer can exercise
his power to counter the sellers’ power and (3) what are the eﬀects of the buyer’s power on
the social welfare. The ﬁrst question might be complicated further if the regulator observes
unstable industry performance and if the prices ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly. Then it is not clear
whether this is a reﬂection of the competition in the industry, a periodic exercise of the buyer
power or a consequence of changes in the structure of the industry. The second question
is no simpler to answer and a regulator using the static textbook theory could not identify
most of the situations in which the buyer has some countervailing power. In order to account
3
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10.2870/205134 2. BUYER POWER UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION AND UNCERTAIN VALUATION
for many situations in which the buyer power arises and to evaluate its social signiﬁcance we
need diﬀerent models of the buyer – seller interaction.
This paper proposes one such model, where the buyer’s power is based on the privately
observed prices and valuation and has two distinctive properties: it is appropriate in a
situation where the industry exhibits unstable performance, as it generates price cycles, and
it captures the role of private information about the valuation of the good in creation of the
buyer power.
Speciﬁcally, I model a buyer with a stochastic valuation of the product who is deciding
whether or not to purchase the product after he has observed the quoted prices and the
realization of the valuation. The buyer cannot carry the consumption from one period to
another (the consumption opportunity is forgone in the next period). The buyer’s valuation
is his private information. The sellers quote the prices of a homogeneous product and do
not observe each other’s quotes. The industry structure (the set of strategies and costs) is
common knowledge.
On the side of the sellers non-cooperative collusive equilibria in the style of Green and
Porter (1984) obtains. In their framework a collusive equilibrium results in the occasional and
temporary price and output reversions to static Nash equilibrium values. These reversions are
the reﬂection of the enforcement mechanism, which in the presence of imperfect information
supports the monopolistic price and levels of production. In the model of Green and Porter
the sellers are colluding at low quantities, whereas in my model the ﬁrms are colluding at a
high price until they have observed a drop in demand when they revert to low price for a
certain number of periods.
The buyer, acting strategically, turns out to obtain a lower price in the equilibrium
compared to the price that can be obtained by the naive buyer. Another result is that in
equilibrium the buyer is exercising his strategic power. Strategic behavior is reﬂected in the
fact that the buyer postpones the purchase when his valuation is below a certain threshold
value (higher than the quoted price) and forgoes a positive net surplus in the period to gain
a higher surplus in the future when the sellers will revert to a low price static equilibrium
for a ﬁxed number of time periods.
2. Related Literature
A related model of the eﬀect of the buyer power on the upstream competition in a
dynamic setting is Snyder (1996). In his model a buyer with deterministic demand can
accumulate a backlog of unﬁlled orders to mimic a boom in the demand and this way force
the sellers to collude at a low price. The mechanism at work is that a large order would
make it more tempting for the sellers to deviate in the period when the order arrives to the
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market, given the possible punishment in subsequent periods. It is this threat and not its
actual execution that prevents collusion at the monopolistic price. That is why in Snyder’s
model in equilibrium demand cycles are not observed; the collusive price is just low enough
for the buyer to purchase every period. One implication of the model, when extended to
several buyers, is that the larger buyer should be charged a lower price in equilibrium than
the smaller one.
In my model it is not the size, but the privately observed valuation of the product,
together with strategic behavior of the buyer, that allows him to obtain a lower price. The
reason for this is diﬀerent than in the model of Snyder. There the buyer can increase the
temptation of the sellers to deviate by increasing the size of the order, mimicking a boom,
and with this the proﬁt from deviation. In my model the buyer is using asymmetry of
information and ”mimics” a deviation of one of the sellers. Though the sellers know that
neither of them has any incentive to deviate in equilibrium, they revert to an outcome of the
static Nash equilibrium as this is the only credible enforcement mechanism.
The ability of the buyer to accumulate orders and postpone consumption at not too high
costs are critical for Snyder’s result. Therefore it is suitable for industries in which the good
does not become obsolete and where the valuation of the good is relatively stable over time.
In contrast, my model applies to industries where these two conditions are not satisﬁed.
For example, consider government purchasing military equipment or high tech products.
Another way in which the model of this paper is diﬀerent from Snyder’s is that it accounts
for the possibility of the stochastic, privately observed valuation of the good on the side
of the buyer. This is what confers the power to the buyer and generates equilibrium price
reversions.
In the way the sellers are modelled, a closely related paper is Green and Porter (1984).
Whereas in my model the ﬁrms are colluding in price as in a version of Green and Porter
(1984) of Tirole (n.d.), in the original model the ﬁrms collude at the monopolistic level of
output. A reversion is triggered by an observed drop in the market price below a certain
trigger price, when the ﬁrms revert to Cournot equilibrium of the static game for a ﬁxed
number of time periods. By deviating a ﬁrm increases the probability that the market price
falls below the trigger price. The reversion is just long enough to make the expected proﬁts
from deviation smaller than the expected loss incurred because of an increase of a probability
that the market price falls below the trigger price.
To generate buyer power other literature makes assumptions on the cost structure of the
sellers, the buyer, or it assumes some speciﬁc bargaining process. Moreover, it usually does
not account for the repeated interaction between the buyer and the sellers.
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A strand of literature on the buyer power uses static Nash bargaining solution concepts.
An example is Horn and Wolinsky (1988), where they show that when the prices are set
in negotiations the market structure in the downstream industry aﬀects the outcomes of
negotiations with the supplier.
Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and Wey (2003) identify the increasing unit costs
of production as a source of buyer power and apply cooperative solution concept to show
that the two downstream ﬁrms are better oﬀ by merging. If the production costs are convex
a large buyer can achieve a lower price in bargaining. While a small buyer is negotiating
over additional production at the margin, holding the unit costs constant, a large buyer can
negotiate an order that spans over a wide production interval and can achieve lower unit
costs.
Biglaiser and Vettas (1993) analyze a set of two period dynamic models, where sellers are
capacity constrained and cannot fulﬁll all the orders addressed to them individually. They
show that these capacity constraints confer signiﬁcant power on the buyers.
Overall, the models that do not use asymmetry of information to generate buyer power
make restrictive assumptions either on the bargaining process or on the cost structure of the
sellers. Though the assumption in the model of this paper, that the sellers have constant and
equal marginal cost is restrictive as well, similar results would obtain under an alternative
symmetric cost structure. On the other hand, the literature that makes use of asymmetric
information does not consider an uncertain valuation on the side of the buyer and thus
misses an important source of the buyer power. Moreover, the models in the literature do
not identify the role of a powerful buyer in the industries with an unstable performance, as
they generate constant equilibrium prices.
3. The Model
There is one buyer and two sellers. The buyer is facing uncertainty about his future
valuation of the good. He can consume only one unit of the good each period. If he consumes
less than one unit he obtains zero utility. He oﬀers to buy zero or one unit of the good each
period (this is called a purchase oﬀer and is denoted by qt). The good is homogeneous and





t = 1. After the buyer makes the oﬀer the sellers can decide whether they
will service his purchase oﬀer or not. After the sellers respond the buyer can proceed with
the purchase (denote this action as ai
t ∈)or decide not to purchase the good. His utility





t . θt is a realization of the random variable drawn from an independent and
identical distribution each period and pi
t is the purchasing price for the seller i. Utility in
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case of no purchase is 0. At the time of the decision on the purchase the uncertainty about
the valuation is resolved and remains the buyer’s private knowledge.
Seller i is setting the price pi
t of homogeneous product, observes purchase oﬀer at that
single price and decides upon whether or not to service the share of the purchase oﬀer
addressed to him (a zero one decision): di
t ∈ {0,1}. Sellers have zero marginal costs are risk
neutral and are maximizing proﬁts.
In every period the timing of the game is the following: Buyer observes his valuation
and sellers quote the prices. After having observed the prices the buyer addresses his oﬀers.
Each of the sellers then observes the purchase oﬀers for his product and decides whether or
not to service the them. Finally the buyer can accept or reject the oﬀer of individual sellers.
I will call the realized purchases demand. This repeats every time period.
I now deﬁne the stage game strategies. Notice that in every period the game has four
sub-stages. In the ﬁrst sub-stage the sellers set the prices.
In the second sub-stage the buyer observes his θ and prices and chooses a policy vector













In the third sub-stage the sellers choose a service policy function li





t ), so that the decision for the seller whether to service or not depends both
on his price and on the purchase oﬀers addressed to him by the buyer.
In the forth sub-stage the buyer chooses a policy function (acceptance) from the set














and st ≡ [sb
t si
t]. The stage game payoﬀs conditional on the realization of the buyer’s type
are given by πb(s(θ),θ) and πi(s(θ),θ) for the buyer and sellers, respectively.
The objective of the buyer in repeated game is to maximize the discounted stream of
utility and the objective of the sellers is to maximize the discounted proﬁts over inﬁnite
horizons. It will come handy to deﬁne the stages with a time index and a subindex denoting
sub-stages. So tk denotes the k-th sub-stage of the t-th stage game. I will not diﬀerentiate
between sub-stages when this will not introduce any ambiguity. At time t in the ﬁrst sub-
stage seller i has observed a history of his oﬀered prices, demands addressed to him and




























Thus a seller does not observe actions of the other seller or buyer directly.
In the second sub-stage of period t, when deciding about the purchase, the buyer has
observed a history of realizations of θ of prices set by sellers and his purchase oﬀers addressed
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Thus a buyer observes prices in the period before making his move.
In the third sub-stage at t seller i has observed hi
t1 and the purchase oﬀers that the buyer
has addressed to him ai
t. I denote this by hi
t3.
In the fourth sub-stage at t the buyer has observed hb
t2 and both sellers’ decisions on
whether or not they want to service his oﬀers (d1
t,d2
t). I denote this by hb
t4.
Let ht denote concatenation [hi
t hb
t] of the histories observed for the buyer and sellers at
the end of the fourth sub-stage at t.
I focus on the pure strategies which simpliﬁes the analysis greatly. Moreover, when
mixing is allowed for, the computation of equilibrium strategies becomes extremely costly,
and it does not seem likely to me that ﬁrms would go through such calculations in such an
uncertain environment. On the other hand, in pure strategies the equilibrium is simple to
compute.
Strategy of the seller i in the ﬁrst sub-stage of the period t1 is a pricing function gi
t :
Hi
t1 → R+. At t3 the strategy is a service function li
t : Hi
t3 × [0,1] × R+ → 0,1. The period
t strategy for the seller is a pair of functions (gt,lt), which I denote by fi
t
The inﬁnite sequence of these functions is denoted by S i. Seller i’s continuation strategy
at the last sub-stage of t is a t-tail subsequence of S i, denoted by S i
t . S i∞
t denotes the
whole set of seller i’s strategies.
Strategy of the buyer in sub-stage 2 of period t is a function ub
t2 from the set of all
potential histories until that sub-stage Hb





In the last (fourth) sub-stage the buyer’s strategy is a function a : Hb
t4 → {0,1}. Period t
strategy of the buyer is a pair of functions (ut,at) which I denote by fb
t.
I denote an inﬁnite sequence of these functions as B. Buyer’s continuation strategy at t
is a t-tail subsequence of B, denoted by Bt. B∞ denotes the whole set of strategies of the
buyer.
A system of beliefs [d1 d2 b] for the sellers and the buyer speciﬁes at each time period t
and observed private histories hi
t,i = 1,2 and hb
t a probability distribution over other players’
private histories.
This game roughly describes an environment in which the upstream market is oligopolis-
tic and downstream market is monopolistic and the ﬁrms are not allowed to form horizontal
agreements or to exchange their sales information. The buyer knows all the relevant param-
eters of his current utility before deciding upon the purchase. The ﬁrms do not communicate
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with each other, do not observe any of the relevant parameters of the buyer’s current utility
and are free to set their prices independently and to respond to the changes in the envi-
ronment as long as this response is not concerted by means of an agreement or exchange of
information.
The following assumptions are used:
: Assumption 1 The buyer’s valuation of the good is characterized by an iid
continuous random variable Θ taking values on the interval [0,1].
: Assumption 2 The buyer can consume only one unit of the good per period.
Consumption of less than one unit brings zero utility to him.
: Assumption 3 The buyer and the sellers know the structure of the industry. The
distribution function G of Θ is common knowledge.
Assumption 1 is not too restrictive in the sense, that the general results follow for any
non-degenerate distribution of Θ. Assumption 3 is standard.
3.1. Equilibrium. To characterize equilibrium I deﬁne stochastic streams of action pro-





These paths are induced by strategy proﬁle [B S] and by a sequence of realizations
of buyer’s valuation inductively in the following way (analogously as Abreu (1988) for non-
stochastic repeated games): s((f)(h0,p0,q0,d0)) = (f)(h0,p0,q0,d0) and
(1) s((f)(ht,pt,qt,dt)) =
f(ht,pt,qt,dt)(s((f)(h0,p0,q0,d0))...s((f)(ht−1,pt−1,qt−1,dt−1)),pt,qt,dt).
Deﬁne the expected continuation values of strategies depending on the observed history











where the expectation is over the outcome paths induced by strategy proﬁle [Bt St] and a
sequence of realizations of Θ. The continuation values for the sellers are deﬁned analogously
and are denoted V
i
(hi
t,[Bt St]). Then we can describe the equilibrium as a strategy proﬁle
[S ∗
i S ∗
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for all t, i and f∗
t \fi
t ∈ S i∞
t .
The expectation is taken over the possible outcomes of the stage game for given strategies
and distribution of random variable Θ. That the conditions (2) and (3) are necessary is
obvious. That they are suﬃcient follows from a single deviation principle (Abreu (1988)).
An equivalent characterization of equilibrium is given by the following conditions. Given























t denotes the optimal strategy proﬁle at t with fb∗
t replaced by fb
t.




















t is the optimal strategy proﬁle with fi∗
t replaced by fi
t.
Because of the stochastic valuation of the buyer it turns out that at any pricing min{p1
t,p2
t} >
0 the buyer will optimally skip a purchase with a strictly positive probability. The reason
for this is that seller i does not observe the actions of the buyer and seller j  = i and any
punishment mechanism for the buyer (high price) would be a reward for the deviating seller.
In eﬀect there is no credible punishment mechanism that would deter the buyer from from
skipping consumption of the good in the periods when his net per-period utility is non-
positive.
The sellers cannot tell just by observing their own demand (realized purchases) whether
there has been a deviation from equilibrium strategies or just a realization of a low valuation
of the good. Because of this uncertainty they will have to periodically resort to punishment
in equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the punishment were
observed with zero probability. This observation leads us to focus on equilibrium strategies
that are analogous to Green and Porter (1984). In equilibrium sellers start by pricing high
and continue to do so as long as their private observations of demand remain high. After a
low private realization of demand they price low for a certain number of period which lasts
long enough to deter the sellers from deviating from equilibrium strategies. Following Greene
and Porter I will call the periods in which ﬁrms set the high price normal and the periods
of punishment phase reversionary.
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I will focus on an equilibrium where the sellers set an equal price and expect to address
1/2 of the demand of the buyer and refuse to service any other demand, knowing that doing
this they will start the price war. If the buyer in the last sub-stage for whatever reason
vetoes this arrangement they will revert to the punishment price in the next period.
Notice that if the sellers will only service 1/2 of purchase oﬀer every period then the
buyer, when it is optimal for him to buy, will oﬀer exactly this arrangement. The buyer
would always want to provoke a price war but he can do this without opportunity costs only
in periods of low valuation (otherwise he has to sacriﬁce a positive per-period surplus). At
ﬁrst sight it seems that the buyer could have provoked a price war by addressing the whole
purchase oﬀer to a single seller. The seller, however, will refuse to service such an arrangement
if there is a credible punishment that can enforce this outcome. Note that the seller will also
refuse to service anything but 1/2 of the purchase oﬀer in the punishment phase. I proceed
by solving the buyer’s problem by assuming that there is such an enforcement mechanism
and use the solution from the buyer’s problem in characterization of the part of the feasible
set of collusive strategies for the sellers.
The system of equilibrium beliefs is rather simple. First the buyer observes all the
information. If the sellers observe a demand which is not equal to 1/2 in the normal phase
they put probability one on an event that there has been a realization of low valuation on the
side of the customer. In the punishment phase they put probability one on the event that the
other seller is not punishing in case they observe demand which is not equal to 1/2 and they
restart the punishment. The sellers put probability one on the event that both the sellers
are punishing when they observe 1/2 demand in the punishment phase. Oﬀ equilibrium the
beliefs are as follows:
(1) The seller who deviates and observes the whole demand puts probability one on the
event where the other seller was quoting collusive price and the buyer’s realization
of valuation was high. In the beginning of the next period he believes that the other
seller is punishing with probability one.
(2) The seller who deviates and observes zero demand puts probability one on the event
that the buyer had a low realization of his valuation and that the other seller was
quoting collusive price. In the beginning of the next period he believes that the
other seller is punishing with probability one.
3.2. The buyer. The value function for the buyer’ s problem, under the above assump-
tions satisﬁes the following Bellman equation:
(6) V
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θ − ¯ p + ρEV b(Θ′,norm)
Figure 1. The function (46) and the reservation ¯ θ
The value of purchase is increas-
ing in θ and the expected value
of postponing the purchase is
constant. The value of θ at
which the lines cross is the point
of indiﬀerence between buying
and postponing the purchase.
where the maximization is over the actions: buy, not buy. Here the fact is used that the
sellers will not service any other share of the demand but 1/2. In that case the buyer will only
be able to start a price war if he does not purchase the good at all in the period. In the case
he decides on the purchase it will then be rational for him to also accept the arrangement
in the last sub-stage of the period. The decisions not to buy and to buy correspond to the
ﬁrst and the second expression on the r.h.s. of (46), respectively. If the buyer makes the
purchase he obtains a ﬂow of utility θ − ¯ p in the current period and faces identical problem
in the next period. By deciding not to purchase in a normal period the buyer gets no utility
in the period and induces a reversion to the price p. The second part of the r.h.s. of (46)
summarizes the expected value for the buyer of being in the ﬁrst period of a reversionary
state.
It is easy to see that the optimality condition for the buyer in normal states takes the
form of a reservation ¯ θ, where for θ ≥ ¯ θ the buyer makes the purchase and does not make
the purchase otherwise. The functional equation (46) is represented in Figure (1).






θ − ¯ p + ρEV b(Θ′,norm) if θ ≥ ¯ θ
ρEV b(Θ′,reve) if θ < ¯ θ

















where the assumption of the stationarity of the random process was used. The stationarity
is used to obtain the expectations about the value functions that are not functions of time,
but only of states (realizations of Θ).
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Equation (8) reﬂects maximization of the buyer, whereby in periods of reversion it is
optimal for him to buy whenever θ ≥ ¯ p. The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (8) captures the ﬂow
of utility during the reversion and the second term captures the value of being in the normal
state after the reversionary period has ﬁnished, appropriately discounted.
¯ θ is the realization of Θ for which the buyer is indiﬀerent between purchasing a unit and
postponing the purchase. From (7) it can be seen that ¯ θ solves the following equation:





Using (8) we get:
















Equation (10) gives ¯ θ for given distribution of Θ, ¯ p , p and T, where ¯ p, p and T completely
characterize equilibrium strategies of the sellers.
From (10) we can express ¯ θ in the following way:



















  ¯ θ
−∞
 



















−¯ p + G(¯ θ)(  + ¯ p) +
  +∞
¯ θ xdG(x)
1 − ρ + G(¯ θ)(ρ − ρT+1)
.
(13) and (11) together implicitly deﬁne ¯ θ as a function of the distribution, ¯ p, p and T,
which characterizes optimal strategy of the buyer.
More generally, the following lemma characterizes the relation between ¯ θ and ¯ p:
Lemma 1. For any continuous distribution of Θ, ¯ θ ≥ ¯ p.
Proof. Suppose to the opposite that ¯ θ < ¯ p. Then a future realization of
Θ, θ ∈ (¯ θ, ¯ p) with positive probability. In this interval the buyer purchases
the good and obtains a negative ﬂow of utility θ− ¯ p. This is not consistent
with utility maximization.￿
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Figure 2. ¯ θ as a function of ¯ p
and T
¯ θ is increasing both in ¯ p and T. ¯ θ is always greater
than ¯ p and the rate of increase of ¯ θ in ¯ p is increasing
with T.
To be able to make more precise statements about the relation between the variables of
interest I further assume that Θ is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. Under this
assumption we obtain the following expression for ¯ Θ:





(1 − ρ)2 + ρ(1 − ρT)
 
ρp(2p − 3)(1 − ρT) + 2¯ p(1 − ρT+1)
 
ρ(1 − ρT)
Figure 2 shows ¯ θ for diﬀerent combinations of pairs (¯ p,T), under the assumption p = 0.
3.3. Sellers. Sellers’ marginal costs are zero and there are no ﬁxed costs. Their objective
is to maximize the ﬂow of proﬁts individually. In equilibrium that I consider the sellers
initially set a collusive price ¯ p and service the demand addressed to each of them if that
demand is 1/2. They continue to do so until the demand for one or more of the sellers
turns to be diﬀerent than collusive share in normal periods or until the buyer rejects the
arrangement in the last sub-stage. In these cases the sellers refuse to service demand and in
the next period they revert to the punishment price p for T periods, after which they return
back to normal price. Let C be the set of all t in which ﬁrms set a high and R be the set
of all reversionary time periods. Given optimal behavior of the buyer and the mechanism
of collusion of the sellers we can characterize the set of feasible values for ¯ p, p and T, given
distribution of Θ that can support tacit collusion.
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where V s(reve) denotes the value of the ﬁrst period of the reversionary (punishment) phase.
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s captures the value from the purchase of the good, and the second
term captures the value of the buyer postponing the purchase.














where the probability of the purchase (1 − G(p)) captures the fact that the buyer cannot,
and does not want to, exercise his power in periods of reversion.




1 − G(¯ θ)
 











1 − G(¯ θ) + δTG(¯ θ)
   .
Since the punishment in the model happens with some probability in every period, we
must have that in any Nash equilibrium the incentive for deviation in collusive and punish-
ment states is absent. Immediate consequence is that along the punishment path we must
have a Nash equilibrium of the static (one stage) game in every t ∈ R 1. This has implications
for the set of feasible p in equilibria.
Lemma 2. Under the assumptions of the model the only p that satisﬁes conditions of
Nash equilibrium of the game is p = 0.
Proof. Assume that the ﬁrms adopt ¯ p in normal periods and punish for
T periods at price p. Such a strategy with pt = 0 for all t ∈ R constitutes
a Nash equilibrium if the value of colluding for ﬁrms in a normal state is
higher than the value of deviation. With p = 0 there is no incentive for
deviation on part of a seller. On the other hand, for any p > 0 a seller has an
incentive to undercut and gain the whole demand with certain probability,
whereas by not undercutting he only gains half of the demand with weakly
lower probability, given the other player’s strategy. Therefore there is no
Nash equilibrium for p > 0.￿
By Lemma 2 a seller would deviate only in periods preceded by a normal period or
in the ﬁrst period after the reversionary phase is over. The price to which it deviates
is a monopolistic price 1/2 in the absence of any other internal restrictions on the side
of the buyer. So, the optimal deviation is upwards2! The reason is that the seller that
does not deviate will refuse to service the purchase oﬀers that the buyer addresses to him.
1This is also true for perfect equilibrium, even if the punishment happens with zero probability.
2Of course in equilibrium this deviation will not ever be observed, so we need not worry about that.
Langus, Gregor (2008), Essays in Competition Economics 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/2051316 2. BUYER POWER UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION AND UNCERTAIN VALUATION
This complicates the presentation, but does not change the results qualitatively. Since in
addition this is a rather surprising and at ﬁrst sight counterintuitive result, I will consider a
case in which a buyer is constrained to always purchase from the cheaper seller (think of a
government purchasing via tenders - the tender commission would not allow the government
to address the whole demand to a single seller).
In this case the optimal deviation is to price ¯ p. If the buyer’s valuation of the good is high
enough the buyer will buy everything from the ﬁrm that deviates. If the buyer’s valuation is
too low then he does not buy the good at this price. In any case this will set the reversionary
phase in the next period. By Lemma 2 the seller will never want to deviate in T.












subject to p ≤ ¯ p.
(18)
The following lemma will be helpful in determining the value of optimal deviation.
Lemma 3. The optimal deviation price p∗ = ¯ p for the class of unimodal distributions.
Proof. The upper bound on ¯ p is monopolistic price pM. Since the uncon-
strained maximization problem of the seller about to deviate (18) yields
exactly pM as the solution, and the value function V(opt.dev) is monotoni-
cally increasing in p for p ∈ [0, ¯ p] the constraint that the buyer is not allowed
to purchase from the more expensive buyer is binding at optimum.￿
Using Lemma 3 we can write the value of optimal deviation as:
(19) V






The ﬁrst term in (19) is the proﬁt in the period of deviation. Since the buyer at the
time of the decision observes both price quotes (and can predict the state of the world in
the next period with certainty, so the incentive for the exercise of strategic power after one
of the sellers has deviated is absent) he will purchase the good if there is any surplus to be
gained in that period (with probability [1 − G(¯ p)]).




Using p = 0 in (17) together with (18), condition (20) becomes:
(21)
[1 − G(¯ θ)](1 − δT+1)




1 − G(¯ θ) + G(¯ θ)δT   ≥ 1,
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or:
(22) 1 − δ
T+1 ≥ 2
[1 − G(¯ p)]
 
1 − δ(1 − G(¯ θ)) + δTG(¯ θ)
 
[1 − G(¯ θ)]
At this stage I use the assumption of the uniform distribution of Θ to write (22) in the
following way:
(23) 2[1 − ¯ p](1 − δ(1 − ¯ θ + ¯ θδ
T)) − (1 − δ
T+1)(1 − ¯ θ) ≤ 0
Using the fact that in equilibrium p = 0 in equation (14) we obtain ¯ θ as a function of
¯ p and T, solely. By plugging this solution for ¯ θ into (23) we get characterization of the set
of pairs of ¯ p and T for which collusion is sustainable. The set, under the assumption of
ρ = δ = 0.95 is represented in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The feasible (¯ p,T)
pairs (p is on the x axis)
With increases in T the set of feasible ¯ p is expanding
for low values of T. However, as T becomes bigger than
4 the set starts shrinking with increases in T. This
happens when the loss from the bigger temptation of
the buyer to start a price war becomes so costly for the
sellers that it is not outweighed by the gain in proﬁts
from higher price that is to be supported by a higher
T.
A natural way to select the pair (¯ p,T) would be the pair that maximizes joint proﬁts.
The expression for joint proﬁts is given by:





where ι is an indicator function taking value 1 in periods of collusion and 0 in reversionary
periods.
The maximization is subject to the constraint (23) which is the condition of Nash equi-




1 − ¯ θ
2
 
1 − δ(1 − ¯ θ + δT ¯ θ)
 ¯ p
subject to (23),
The value function is represented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Value function of
the ﬁrm
For a given T and for low values of ¯ p the value of the
ﬁrms is increasing in ¯ p. Above certain ¯ p the value
starts decreasing in ¯ p. This is because the gain in the
value from the increase in price is outweighed by the
loss due to the increase in the probability of the price
war, which is determined by the ¯ θ and the probability
distribution of the buyer’s valuation. For a given ¯ p
the value of the seller is decreasing in T for obvious
reasons. The problem of the sellers is to maximize this
function subject to the constraint depicted in Figure
3.
I obtain the solution to this problem numerically, for δ = ρ = 0.95. The optimal pair
(¯ p,T) is (0.08,2).
When the buyer has no internal restrictions the seller who deviates will set the monopo-
listic price. In this case, for the parameters as above there is no collusive equilibrium. The
buyer is more powerful and achieves a better outcome for himself.
3.4. Naive buyer. It is interesting to compare the equilibrium results of the model
with the results of the model where the buyer is naive. I model this case by assuming that
the buyer, in case his net valuation is nonnegative (θ − p ≥ 0), always purchases the good
from the cheaper seller, and splits the order equally between the sellers when quoted prices
are the same. In case of the negative net valuation he does not purchase the good.
I hold the information set of the sellers to be the same as in the previous case. The value
for the sellers, knowing that the buyer is naive, of being in a collusive state is given by the
following equation, which is a version of (15):
(26) V









where the interpretation is similar to the one for equation (15), with the diﬀerence that now
the buyer accepts a simple purchasing rule, under which he buys with probability 1 − G(¯ p)
in normal periods.
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(26) and (27) give the following expression for the value of collusion: V s(norm):
(28) V
s(norm) =
(1 − G(¯ p)) ¯ p
2(1 − δ(1 − G(¯ p) + δTG(¯ p)))
.
Using Lemma 3 the optimal deviation is again to ¯ p and the value of optimal deviation
for p = 0 is:
(29) V
s(opt.dev.) = [1 − G(¯ p)]¯ p + δ
T+1V
s(norm).
Using the condition for collusion to be feasible (20) we obtain the following set of pairs
(¯ p,T) for which the collusion is feasible:
(30) −1 + δ
T+1 + 2(1 − δ(1 − G(¯ p) + δ
TG(¯ p))) ≤ 0,
which,under the assumption of uniform distribution of Θ simpliﬁes to:
(31) −1 + δ
T+1 + 2(1 − δ(1 − p + δ
Tp)) ≤ 0
Figure 5 represents pairs (¯ p,T) that satisfy (31).
Figure 5. The feasible (¯ p,T)
pairs (p is on the x axis)
As in Figure 4 with higher T the set of feasible ¯ p is
expanding for low values of T. Here, however, as T
becomes bigger this set never starts shrinking with in-
creases in T. This is due to the fact that the buyer
is not acting strategically and is not tempted more to
start a price war for higher T.




1 − ¯ p
2(1 − δ(1 − ¯ p + δT ¯ p))
¯ p
subject to (30),
we get the pair (¯ p,T) = (0.23,2), for the same parameter values as before. The price that
the naive buyer obtains in equilibrium is more than twice higher than the price obtained by
the strategic buyer exercising his upstream power.
The value function is represented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Value function for
the sellers when facing naive
buyer
The interpretation here is similar to interpretation in
Figure 4. A diﬀerence to the value function when the
sellers are facing a strategic buyer is that here the
unconstrained maximum is achieved at monopolistic
price p = 0.5, whereas before this price was lower.
3.5. Equilibria for beta distribution of valuation. More generally, we can char-
acterize the equilibria under other distributions numerically. In this section I apply to the
model the beta distribution, of which the uniform distribution over [0,1] is a special case, and
which gives for diﬀerent values of parameters very diverse patterns of stochastic valuations.
This way I can compare diﬀerent situations.
Beta probability density takes values only on the interval (0,1). The distributions that I
take as an example are represented in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Beta distributions
of Θ





where B(.,.) is a beta function, and ι is an indicator
function taking value 1 when x is between 0 and 1 and
value 0 otherwise.
By changing parameters a and b I obtain the distri-
butions in the ﬁgure. (For (a,b) = (4,4) we get the
bell shaped distribution, and for (a,b) = (0.2,0.2) we
get the most extreme inverse bell shaped distribution.
(a,b) = (1,1) gives the uniform distribution.
I dealt with the uniform distribution analytically above. It represents the case of highest
level of uncertainty for the sellers about the valuation of the buyer. The bell shaped distri-
bution represents a situation where the valuation of the buyer is centered around 0.5 most of
the time and the distributions with the higher probabilities in the tails represent a situation




¯ p T ¯ θ V(coll) prob. of rev.
pdf naive str. naive str. naive str. naive str.
Beta(1,1) 0.23 0.09 2 2 0.38 1.24 0.53 0.23 0.38
Beta(4,4) 0.3 0.12 2 2 0.32 2.12 0.79 0.13 0.15
Beta(0.75,0.75) 0.28 0.08 3 2 0.19 1.04 0.44 0.31 0.23
Beta(0.5, 0.5) 0.23 0.09 3 3 0.23 0.83 0.35 0.32 0.32
Beta(0.3,0.3) 0.25 0.09 5 4 0.21 0.58 0.25 0.38 0.36
Beta(0.2,0.2) 0.22 0.09 6 6 0.22 0.43 0.19 0.4 0.4
Optimal values are obtained for ρ = δ = 0.95
Table 1. Parameters of collusive equilibria
where the buyer most of the time either has a relatively low or relatively high valuation for
the good. The results are depicted in Table 3.
A notable feature of the results in Table 3 is the increase in the length of the optimal
price wars as we move to a distribution which puts higher probabilities at the extreme values.
Moreover, the probability of the buyer not making a purchase, thereby setting the price war,
is increasing as well (with the exception of uniform distribution). This obviously implies an
increasing frequency of price wars. In the model with a strategic buyer ¯ θ is always higher
than ¯ p (this holds more generally according to Lemma 1), which means that the buyer does
sometimes forgo a positive current period utility to exercise his strategic power and start a
price war.
A prediction of the model, which is intuitive, is that the optimal lengths of price wars
are never longer when the sellers are facing strategic buyer. This is a consequence of the fact
that ¯ θ is increasing with T. A higher T can support a higher ¯ p, but a higher ¯ p has an eﬀect
on proﬁts in two directions. A direct positive eﬀect and indirect negative eﬀect through an
increase in ¯ θ which raises the probability of price war. When the buyer is naive, an increase
in T does not aﬀect directly the probability of price wars. Therefore an increase in T in the
case of naive buyer will optimally support a higher increase in ¯ p, compared to the situation
with a strategic buyer.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed a market in which buyer and two sellers of a homogeneous
good interact in an inﬁnitely repeated game. The buyer observes a realization of his stochastic
valuation of the good, which remains his private information, and the price quotes. Then he
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decides whether or not to purchase the good, taking into account the fact that his decision
may aﬀect future prices.
A seller sets the price which is not directly observable by the other seller and observes
the history of the demands addressed to him, but not to the other seller. I assumed that the
sellers are colluding in price and adopt an enforcement mechanism proposed by Green and
Porter (1984). The sellers revert to a marginal cost pricing (zero price) for a number periods
after they have observed a drop in the demand addressed to them.
Because the prices are not directly observable by sellers they cannot monitor collusive
compliance perfectly and have to rely on imperfect signals of the level of the demand ad-
dressed to each of them individually. The mechanism that enforces collusion of the sellers
results in occasional reversions to the price of static Nash equilibrium. The buyer can use
the enforcement mechanism of the sellers to induce a reversion to low price, when the cost
of doing this (postponing the purchase) is lower than the beneﬁts (low price for a certain
number of periods). Because of the informational advantage the buyer, acting strategically,
can achieve a lower collusive price in equilibrium, compared to the situation when the ﬁrms
know that the buyer is naive.
Besides a lower price the strategic buyer pays for the good, the model predicts that
the length of the reversions to low price in equilibrium increases with the increases in the
probability of the extreme valuations of the good. Moreover, the price wars when the sellers
are facing the strategic buyer are not longer than with naive buyer.
A rough welfare comparison, where the weights in total welfare are equal for the sellers
and the buyer, picks up naive buyer situation as preferable for most of the valuations of the
good. The intuition is simple. A strategic buyer ”wastes” some of the available surplus to
obtain lower prices.
This model can explain the nature of the interaction between a powerful buyer and pow-
erful sellers in an industry which exhibits unstable performance and the buyer has stochastic
valuation of the good. It shows that the buyer can eﬀectively counter the seller power and ob-
tain signiﬁcantly lower price. Moreover, it sheds light on the possible source of welfare loss in
interactions between the buyer with a power upstream and sellers with a downstream power.
The traditional result of the static analysis, that the powerful buyer without downstream
power facing powerful sellers is always preferable in terms of welfare, is in contradiction with
the results of this model.
The model has a very simple structure and utility of the buyer is not very realistic.
However, in case of a more full speciﬁcation of utility the buyer would be using exactly
the same mechanism to disturb collusion of the sellers. The optimal rules will be more
complicated, but the results will go in the same direction.




The limitations of the model are suggestive of the possible extensions.
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The eﬀect of EU antitrust investigations and ﬁnes on a ﬁrm’s
valuation
1. Introduction
Antitrust laws are fundamental in market economies, as they prevent ﬁrms from distorting
competition in a way that is detrimental to economic eﬃciency, and ﬁnes are a crucial tool
for the enforcement of antitrust laws. Only if the ﬁnes, and more generally the costs that
ﬁrms incur when found guilty of antitrust infringement, are large enough, will the ﬁrms be
deterred from engaging in cartels and other anti-competitive behavior.
In the US, managers who have been found guilty of a conspiracy can be given prison
sentences, and ﬁrms are subject to ﬁnes and to the payment of treble damages in private
actions. In the EU, which is the object of this study, competition law violators are not
subject (at EU level) to criminal penalties, and private damages actions are extremely rare,
but ﬁrms can in principle be given ﬁnes up to 10% of their previous year’s turnover.
Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that the impact of antitrust investigations and ﬁnes may
not be that large for ﬁrms which are caught infringing EU competition law. Indeed, a large
number of ﬁrms (and in fact some ﬁrms from the sample we analyze in this paper) are repeat
oﬀenders. Moreover, negative Commission decisions and Community Court judgments do
not seem to trigger management changes very often. This raises the question of the extent
to which ﬁrms are seriously aﬀected by the ﬁnes they receive, or expect to receive.
In this paper, we carry out an empirical analysis to explore the eﬀect of antitrust investi-
gations on the share prices of ﬁrms which have infringed European competition law. To our
knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst work which tries to estimate the impact of European antitrust
investigations on oﬀending ﬁrms.1 In an exercise carried out for the US, Bosch and Woodrow
(1991) use a similar methodology to estimate the eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s stock market price of
an indictment for price ﬁxing.2 They ﬁnd that the shares of indicted ﬁrms in their sample
1For empirical analysis of the eﬀects of EU merger notiﬁcations and decisions, which make use of the
event study methodology also used here, see Duso, Neven and R¨ oller (2006a) and Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu
(2006b).
2Bizjak and Coles (1995) carry out another event study analysis on US data relative to private antitrust
litigation. They ﬁnd that, on average, defendants lose approximately 0.6 percent of their equity value (and
plaintiﬀs gain less than what defendants lose).
25
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on average lose a cumulative 1.08% of their value in the days immediately after the public
announcement of the indictment.3 They estimate that ﬁnes and damages account for only
13% of the total loss of stock market value caused by the ﬁrm’s antitrust indictment.
The main reason why an antitrust investigation may create a loss in the ﬁrm’s value
which goes well beyond the ﬁne is that the ﬁrm will likely have to put an end to a proﬁtable
activity (be it a cartel, an abusive practice, or any other business practice considered illegal
by the antitrust agencies and the courts).4,5
The EU competition law institutional framework, in a nutshell. Since our ob-
jective is to analyze the eﬀect of antitrust investigations, it is appropriate to brieﬂy remind
the reader of the main actors in the ﬁeld of EU competition law, and of the main events
which occur in a typical investigation. The European Commission is the primary competition
authority for the enforcement of EU competition law, whose main provisions are contained in
articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Fines can be imposed
on ﬁrms which have infringed articles 81 or 82, and Regulation 1/2003 (which has replaced
Regulation 17/1962, which contained very similar provisions for the purposes of our article)
establishes the main rules for the Commission’s ﬁning policy: in particular, ﬁnes are imposed
at the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions are however subject to the review of
the Community Courts, i.e. the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ); they can never be higher than 10% of the ﬁrm’s worldwide turnover in the
previous year; they should be proportional to the gravity and duration of the infringements;
and they cannot consist of criminal penalties.
In 1998, the Commission published a Notice containing the Guidelines (i.e., a code of
practice) that it would follow in deciding ﬁnes,6 but several commentators still criticize the
Commission for a lack of transparency and for exercising too much discretion in its ﬁning
decisions.
3An indictment by the US Department of Justice should be ’news’ to the markets, as the indictment
is preceded by investigations which are supposed to be secret. Bosch and Woodrow (1991) also check for
possible leaks before the indictment takes place and take appropriate steps to deal with them.
4Furthermore, in some cases, the ﬁrm may also have to comply with (structural or behavioral) remedies
which could lower its proﬁts even more.
5Other sources of loss in value, in addition to the direct eﬀect of the ﬁnes, could be: (i) legal and
consulting fees for antitrust proceedings; (ii) the ﬁrm may have to give up proﬁtable projects either because
the management is distracted by the antitrust investigations, and/or because, in case of large ﬁnes, the
ﬁrm will have lower retained earnings and cash: in imperfect ﬁnancial markets, lower assets will limit the
ﬁrm’s ability to obtain credit; and (iii) the ﬁrm may be hurt by the negative publicity following an antitrust
investigation.
6On 28 June 2006, the European Commission slightly revised the Guidelines for setting antitrust ﬁnes.
However, all the observations in our sample date from before June 2006.




Note also that the turnover referred to in the Regulation is not necessarily the turnover
in the relevant product (and geographic) market involved by the antitrust investigation.7
However calculated, commentators (and the Commission itself) agree that, until 1979
(with the Pioneer Decision, which is also the ﬁrst Decision in our sample), the Commission
was rather lenient when imposing ﬁnes.8 Table A.1 in the Appendix provides information
about the ﬁnes given to the ﬁrms in our sample: they range from 0 to 497 million euro.9
How an antitrust investigation proceeds. The European Commission, or more pre-
cisely its Directorate General for Competition (DG-COMP), begins its investigation either
at its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint from a third party (although, if complaints
occur, the Commission has no obligation to start an antitrust procedure). There is (gener-
ally) no announcement that an investigation has started, and no precise time frame for it.
If during the preliminary stages the Commission has serious suspicions that there has been
an antitrust infringement, it can carry out a surprise inspection, also called a dawn raid,
on the premises of the ﬁrm(s), to gather documentary evidence (which is absolutely crucial
for anticompetitive agreement cases, but relevant for abuse cases too).10 A well-established
jurisprudence obliges the Commission to take steps to respect the rights of the defendants
during the investigation.11 Among these, the Commission has to send a Statement of Objec-
tions to the ﬁrms under investigation, where it states its allegations regarding the practices
of the ﬁrm and asks for the ﬁrm’s response.
After having analyzed all the evidence and having heard from the parties, the Commission
will take a Decision, which may be reached a long time after the Statement of Objections
(in some cases, it may even take a few years). A relevant feature for our analysis is that the
7Since relevant market turnover data are typically not published in the Commission Decisions for conﬁ-
dentiality reasons, it is not possible to identify whether the base ﬁne is computed as a percentage of turnover.
This should change in the future: the June 2006 Guidelines provide that the base ﬁnes may be up to 30%
of the company’s annual sales in the market to which the antitrust infringement relates, multiplied by the
number of years of participation in the infringement, provided the total is within the limit of 10% of the
ﬁrm’s total annual turnover.
8See for instance Geradin and David (2005, p. 20 and ﬀ.).
9A noteworthy element of the Commission’s ﬁning policy is the possibility to grant, under its Leniency
Program, reductions in ﬁnes to ﬁrms which cooperate in cartel investigations. A zero ﬁne is due to the
fact that the Commission can grant a 100% ﬁne reduction to a ﬁrm which reports information allowing the
Commission to have suﬃcient evidence to convict ﬁrms involved in a cartel. See Motta (2004) for a textbook
analysis of leniency programs.
10Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can also conduct surprise inspections at the homes
(and private vehicles) of ﬁrms’ managers and employees.
11Indeed, several Commission Decisions have been annulled by the Community Courts on various pro-
cedural grounds.
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Decision is a collegial decision of the whole European Commission, not of DG-COMP, and
before the Decision is taken several bodies are consulted, such as representatives of national
competition authorities and members of other directorates general. Although all the people
involved are bound by conﬁdentiality clauses, leaks about (or speculations on) the content
of the Decision and the level of the ﬁnes are common.
Firms which have been ﬁned can appeal to the Community Courts, which can rule upon
the merits of the Commission Decision, and whose Judgments can annul, reduce, uphold or
even increase the ﬁne (although to our knowledge neither the CFI nor the ECJ has ever
increased the Commission’s ﬁnes), as well as of course annul or uphold, completely or partly,
the overall Decision. The last column of Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the ﬁnes
as they appeared in the ﬁrst Court judgments;12 the penultimate column reports the ratio
between the ﬁne and the ﬁrm’s capitalization.
The decisions taken by the Court are not made public until the moment they are an-
nounced, although in some cases there may be signs of the judges’ views.13
Our approach. We use standard event study methodology to investigate the eﬀect of
the antitrust investigation on the ﬁrm’s share price. More particularly, we try to do so
by analyzing the eﬀect of the three main events in the investigation procedure identiﬁed
above: (i) the dawn raid, (ii) the Commission Decision, and (iii) the Court’s judgment.14
For each of these events there is a precise date on which they occur, even if in some cases
it cannot be pinpointed (and when this happens, the observation is dropped). However,
surprise inspections do not always take place and ﬁrms may decide not to appeal.
Note that these events diﬀer in the extent to which they represent a genuine surprise to
investors. In other words, some of the events may have been expected and thus may have
already been reﬂected in the price of the relevant securities before the actual date of the
event. In such circumstances, the event dates are not good proxies for the time when the
news about the (expected) event reached the market. Thus, our analysis might lead us to
reject the null hypothesis of no eﬀect more often than it should be.15
12In older cases, the ﬁrms’ appeal was decided by the ECJ. In more recent years, it is the CFI which
decides; ﬁrms can also appeal the CFI’s judgment. We do not look at this ’second’ judgment, and only
consider the ﬁrst judgment, whichever Court takes it.
13In particular the opinion of the Advocate General often (though not always) anticipates the judgment
of the Court. However, Advocates General are only involved in the ECJ’s procedures and not the CFI’s.
14We also looked at the eﬀects of the Statement of Objections, but as expected we did not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant eﬀect of this event on the value of the ﬁrm.
15In other words, when the news of the event reaches the market it may trigger an eﬀect, but by using
the date of the event, which is anticipated by the market, we may not be able to catch this eﬀect.
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(i) The surprise inspection, or dawn raid, should represent a genuine surprise for the
investors. To verify that this is really an unexpected event, we examined past issues of the
Financial Times for any news about the (potential) investigation before the inspection took
place, and we could not ﬁnd any, for any of the ﬁrms for which we have dates of the raid.16
Because the surprise inspection may allow the Commission to ﬁnd incriminating evidence
and because it is typically done only after the Commission already has some motivated
suspicion of infringement, this event is likely to signal that a negative Decision of antitrust
infringement will ultimately be taken.17 Accordingly, a dawn raid should induce investors to
revise downwards their valuation of the ﬁrm.
(ii) Next, we investigate the eﬀect of the Commission Decision. As explained above, the
market has already been aware that the Commission has been investigating the ﬁrm since
the dawn raid or at least since the Statement of Objections. The investors should therefore
be expecting the Decision to be taken at some time.18 Under the eﬃcient market hypothesis
(see Section 2.2), this information should be included in the price so that we do not expect
a large systematic under- or over–valuation of the possible eﬀect of the publication of the
Decision of the Commission on the value of the ﬁrm.
(iii) Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of the Court’s judgments, in particular when the
judges signiﬁcantly reduce or annul the ﬁne, which we would expect to have a positive eﬀect
on the ﬁrm’s valuation if it came as a surprise.
The paper continues in the following way. Section 3 describes our data and explains
our estimation procedure. Section 4 reports the results of our analysis and discusses their
robustness. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses tentative policy implications.
2. Modelling the antitrust procedure
Since the antitrust procedure involves diﬀerent (but related) events, we propose an ex-
tremely simpliﬁed model of this procedure. Although the model admittedly captures only
some features of a real antitrust procedure, we show that it may help understand better
our estimates, as well as make some explorative inferences on two variables which cannot
16It is of course possible that investors may none the less anticipate that an investigation will take place.
This may be the case in particular for some of the international cartel cases which appear in our sample,
where a US antitrust case precedes the EU investigation. We deal with this issue in Section 4.1 below.
17We were unable to verify in how many cases the ﬁrms that were raided were later found not to be
guilty and therefore were not subject to any ﬁne, because Decisions are taken only when an infringement is
found. If in the course of the investigation the Commission ﬁnds no evidence that a ﬁrm has violated the
law (a rare event after a dawn raid though), there is usually no public announcement that the investigation
has ended.
18By examining past issues of the Financial Times we found that the news about the potential threat
of a ﬁne is concentrated in a period of a month before the date of the Decision.
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be directly estimated by looking at our dataset: 1) the probability that a dawn raid takes
place (that is, the probability that a ﬁrm might be investigated); and 2) the eﬀect on ﬁrms’
market proﬁts (and in turn market prices) that is caused by an infringement Decision of the
European Commission.
Assume that a ﬁrm has to decide whether to engage or not in a certain anticompetitive
business practice, and that if such a practice is undertaken the Commission Decision and
the Court Judgment are probabilistic.19 This may be rationalised as a situation where
the outcome of a certain investigation depends on some factors - such as the discovery of
documental evidence and the respect of the procedures - that may be casual. Assume also
that there is no investigation if the ﬁrm decides not to infringe antitrust law. This is an
admittedly crude assumption, but recall that, ﬁrst, we are just interested in a description of
the antitrust procedure and, second, all the data we have refer to ﬁrms which have eventually
been the object of an infringement decision by the Commission, so we have no information
about ﬁrms which have certainly not violated the law.
The description of the antitrust game is as follows (see also Figure ). At time 0, the ﬁrm
decides whether to violate the law or not in a particular market. If it does not, it will get
the payoﬀ πC forever, giving it a value of πC/(1 − δ) in the market concerned. At time 1,
Nature determines whether the ﬁrm will be subject to a surprise inspection - event which
takes place with probability m) or not. Since being subject to an investigation does not
imply yet that the practice at hand is being sanctioned, the ﬁrm will receive a proﬁt πM
independently of Nature’s move. If no raid is undertaken, though, we assume that the ﬁrm
will never be investigated any longer, and will enjoy proﬁt πM forever.20 By denoting the
discount factor by δ, the net present value of proﬁts in this market will be πM/(1 − δ).
If a raid has taken place at time 1, the Commission will investigate the practice further.
With probability 1 − p, the Commission will not ﬁnd proof of the infringement and the
case will be dropped. Therefore, the ﬁrm will not be investigated any longer and it will
receive proﬁts πM in every period. With a probability p the Commission will ﬁnd proof of an
infringement and at time 2 it will issue a Decision imposing a ﬁne, F, and ordering the ﬁrm
19The practice may concern either abusive behavior or cartel participation. We have chosen to consider
a ﬁrm’s infringement decision in isolation for simplicity. The model could be extended to deal with cartel
decisions, by analyzing the incentive constraint for collusion of the ﬁrms involved. However, it would be more
complex to deal with the existence of leniency programs: as in Motta and Polo (2003), the model should
allow for ﬁrms to apply for leniency after an investigation is opened, and should also take into account the
institutional features of the leniency programme in the EU. This is beyond the scope of the present paper.
20A slightly more sophisticated version of the model would be that in each period the Commission could
do a surprise inspection from the pool of the ﬁrms which have not been investigated previously, but this
would not qualitatively change the results.
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Figure 1. Game tree
to cease the business practice. We assume that if there is an infringement Decision, the ﬁrm
will have to cease the business practice immediately (the per-period market proﬁt will be πC
in the current period and all following periods), but it can delay the payment of the ﬁne until
the Court’s judgment. This is consistent with what happens in cartel cases (which compose
the majority of the observations in our sample), where the Commission takes a negative
Decision only when there is documental evidence of the infringement (and it is unlikely that
the ﬁrms will continue to engage in collusive behavior) and the Court usually annuls the ﬁne
only for procedural reasons and it reduces it only when it has a diﬀerent assessment of the
gravity and duration of the infringement.
At time 3, the Court will uphold the Commission’s Decision with probability q and will
annul the ﬁne with the remaining probability 1 − q.21 If the Judgment is in favor of the
Commission, the ﬁrm will pay the ﬁne F, otherwise it does not. We assume that the ﬁrm
always appeals the infringement Decision. (This is largely consistent with what happens in
reality, and of course it makes sense in the model because the cost of appealing is taken to
be zero for simplicity.)
Further, since the ﬁrms are in our sample are multi-product and multi-national ﬁrms,
we assume that each ﬁrm operates not only in the market where the infringement and the
antitrust investigation take place, but also in n other independent (product or geographic)
markets, in each of which for simplicity the ﬁrm earns a proﬁt πC.
Finally, we assume for analytical convenience that the ﬁne is set as a percentage of the
ﬁrm’s competitive value, i.e. F = f(n + 1)πC/(1 − δ).22
In order to investigate how the occurrence of a certain antitrust event aﬀects the valuation
(that is, the net present value) of the ﬁrm, it is convenient to start from the last period, that
is the Court’s judgment.
21Of course, the Court is free to set any level of the ﬁnes it deems correct, so the ﬁne should be a
continuous variable. To simplify matters, though, we assume that it has a binary choice. In estimating the
eﬀects of the Court’s judgment, we say that the Court ’annuls’ a Decision whenever the ﬁne is reduced to a
level which is below the 2/3 of the ﬁne proposed by the Commission, and ’upholds’ it otherwise.
22In our sample, we calculate the ﬁne as percentage of the value of the ﬁrm at the moment of the
Commission Decision. Using this expression, however, would considerably complicate the model.
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If the judgment annuls the Commission Decision, the ﬁrm will not have to pay the ﬁne,





If instead the Court upholds the ﬁne, the ﬁrm’s value will be:
(34) VU =
πC(1 + n)(1 − f)
1 − δ
.
Immediately before the Court decides, the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm will be:
(35) EVJ = qVU + (1 − q)VA =
(1 + n)(1 − fq)πC
1 − δ
.









If the Commission issues a negative Decision, and before the Court judgment, the ex-
pected proﬁts of the ﬁrm are:
(37) VD = π
C + nπ
C + δEVJ =
(1 + n)(1 − δfq)πC
1 − δ
,
whereas immediately before a Commission Decision is taken the ﬁrm’s value will be:
(38) EVCD = pVD + (1 − p)
 
πM + nπC 
1 − δ
=
(n + p − δfpq(n − 1))πC + (1 − p)πM
1 − δ
.






(1 − p)(πM − πC(1 − δfq(1 + n)))
πM (1 − p) + πC (n(1 − δfpq) + p(1 − δfq))
< 0.
After a dawn raid, and before a Decision is taken, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are:
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(40) VR = π
M + nπ
C + δEVCD =
(n(1 − δ2fpq) + δp(1 − δfq))πC + (1 − δp)πM
1 − δ
.
Immediately before Nature decides whether there is a dawn raid, the expected proﬁts of
the ﬁrm will be:
(41) EVR = (1 − m)
 
πM + nπC 
1 − δ
+ mVR =
(n + δpm − (n + 1)δ2fpmq)πC + (1 − δpm)πM
1 − δ
.
We can now use these probabilities to calculate the change in expected proﬁts caused by







δp(1 − m)(πM − πC(1 − δfq(1 + n)))
(n + δpm − (n + 1)δ2fpmq)πC + (1 − δpm)πM < 0.
Finally, note that the ﬁrm will decide to violate antitrust laws if the expected proﬁt in
case of violation, which coincides with the expected proﬁts before the raid is decided, EVR, is
higher than the expected proﬁt in case of complying with the law, Vnot = (n+1)πC/(1−δ).
The inequality EVR > Vnot can be rewritten as:
 
πM − πC 













Note that f∗ is nothing else than the optimal ﬁne, that is, the minimum ﬁne necessary
to achieve deterrence of anticompetitive behavior. If f ≥ f∗, the ﬁrm will comply with law;
If f < f∗, it prefers to violate it.
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Independent estimates of probabilities. Before proceeding, note that it is possible to have
some independent estimates of some of the parameters of the model; in particular, of the
probabilities p and q.
To ﬁnd have an estimate of the probability q that a Commission’s ﬁne is upheld by the
Court, ﬁrst of all recall that we have the sample of all European Commission’s antitrust
Decisions, but we could use only a very small subset of it, since only a minority of the
ﬁrms ﬁned by the Commission are (or were at the time of the Decision) publicly quoted.
We have therefore looked at all the antitrust cases where the ﬁrst Court judgment was
available. In this way, we have computed the average probability q that the Court upholds
the Commission’s Decision.23
It is possible that the estimated probability is biased with respect to the expected prob-
ability of the ﬁrm in our sample. For instance, it may be that the Court is more lenient
towards small ﬁrms, which are typically less likely to be publicly quoted, or the opposite -
that largest ﬁrms are more likely to hire the best legal and economic counsel and therefore
more likely to win a case in court. As a check, we have also looked at the average probability
that a Commission Decision is upheld in our sub-sample of publicly quoted ﬁrms. As one
can check from Table 1, there are 53 cases of ﬁne reduction, 37 cases of upheld ﬁnes, and 32
cases where the ﬁrms ﬁled no appeal (in the remaining cases in the sample, either we have
no information if an appeal was made, or the appeal is still pending at the time of writing).
Therefore,   q = 69/122 = .56.
In order to ﬁnd the probability p that a dawn raid is followed by the Commission’s De-
cision and ﬁne, recall that the Commission systematically reports information about dawn
raids only when an infringement decision is taken (although since Monti’s tenure as Commis-
sioner, DG-Competition often makes press releases on surprise inspections). Further, recall
that if the Commission undertakes a surprise inspection and later discovers that it does not
have enough evidence for the successful prosecution of the case (or it becomes convinced
that the ﬁrm’s business practice is not unlawful), then it does not issue a formal Decision,
but may make a public statement about its decision not to pursue the case further.
In order to estimate p, we therefore looked for information on dawn raids by analyzing
several databases containing press agency statements, newspapers’ articles, and European
23As mentioned above, we consider ’annulled’ a judgment which imposes a ﬁne which is lower than 2/3
of the Commission ﬁne, and ’upheld’ ﬁnes above this threshold. We also considered as ’upheld’ all cases
where the ﬁrms have not appealed the Commission’s Decision (as presumably the ﬁrms in such cases were
convinced that the Court would have not annulled the ﬁne). Further details (the table with all the cases we
have data for), are available from the authors upon request.
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Commission’s press reports.24,25 In this way, we could uncover a large number of dawn raids,
and we then checked whether after the raids there were infringement decisions or not.26,27
Both because this was a very time-consuming operation, and because prior to the year
2000 there rarely was public disclosure of dawn raids, we limited ourselves to look for such
information for the years from 1998 to 2004 (both inclusive). We excluded years too close
to us because the Commission needs a few years to issue an infringement decision. The
estimated value of the probability that a ﬁrm is ﬁned after being raided by the Commission’s
oﬃcials is   p = .69.28
We may also estimate the discount factor δ which can be written as δ = 1/(1+r), where
r is the interest rate. On annual basis, with an interest rate of 5%, the discount factor would
be   δ = .95, whereas if we consider an annual proﬁtability rate (instead of the interest rate)
of 10%, then we would have   δ = .91. Note, however, that if the period elapsing between one
antitrust event and the other is not one but, say, two years, then the true discount factor
should be δ = 1/(1 + r)2, giving us estimates of respectively   δ = .91 and   δ = .83.
Finally, from our data in Table 1 we can proxy the parameter f with the percentage of
the ﬁne over the capitalization of the ﬁrm as   f = 1.9.
Therefore, there are only two parameters of the model we could not independently esti-
mate, that is, the ratio between competitive and anticompetitive per-period proﬁts, πC/πM,
and the probability that a ﬁrm which is violating antitrust law is being raided by the Com-
mission. The latter is obviously impossible to estimate in the real world since we would need
to know the number of ﬁrms which are infringing competition law, something that obviously
we cannot observe. Note, however, that this is a crucial parameter for anyone interested
in analyzing the deterrence power of the ﬁnes (the expected cost of infringing the law will
24More precisely, our sources were: Agence Europe, DG Competition website, Lexis-Nexis, and the
European Commission’s annual Report on Competition Policy. In all cases, the keywords used for our search
were: ”dawn raid”, or ”inspection”, or ”premises”.
25Sometimes the Commission does release news that a case has been dropped and might mention that
the case was opened by a surprise inspection in certain ﬁrms. In other occasions, it issues a press release
that a dawn raid has been carried out.
26Note that - in order not to bias the estimate - when proceeding in this way we have not added to the
sample of dawn raids unveiled by these databases the dawn raids referred to in the decisions (in some cases,
it might happen that a Decision mentions a dawn raid that no database had published).
27Unfortunately, most of the data about dawn raids so obtained were not precise enough for them to
be used to enlarge the sample that we later use for empirical estimates: either the precise ﬁrms were not
mentioned, or the precise data was not mentioned, or the ﬁrms were not publicly quoted. But for the purpose
of estimating p, it was enough to know the number of ﬁrms involved in the case and whether they ended up
being ﬁned or not.
28Details available from the authors upon request.
Langus, Gregor (2008), Essays in Competition Economics 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/2051336 3. THE EFFECT OF EU ANTITRUST INVESTIGATIONS AND FINES ON A FIRM’S VALUATION
depend on m). Indeed, many people are trying to compute optimal ﬁnes by guessing m but
there have been rare attempts to seriously estimating this value.
3. Estimation of abnormal returns
In this Section, we ﬁrst describe our data, and then the estimation procedure we follow.
3.1. Data. Our data come from Commission Decisions, published in the Oﬃcial Jour-
nal of the European Communities, and judgments of the Court of First Instance and the
European Court of Justice, published in the European Court Reports and other sources.
The data refer to all the Decisions resulting in a ﬁne from 1969 until 2005. In the Deci-
sions the Commission describes the investigation and usually reports the date of the surprise
inspection, if it was made.
We have retained only decisions involving the ﬁrms quoted in a stock exchange for which
data on share price are available in the Datastream database.29 Our ﬁnal sample refers to
58 decisions (the ﬁrst of which dates from 1979) involving 97 ﬁrms. Some of the ﬁrms were
repeat oﬀenders.30
Data on share prices are not available for all the ﬁrms at the time of the events. For
this reason we are forced to drop further observations from our sample. We have exact
dates of Commission Decisions and data on the share prices at the time of the Decision
for 147 infringements of either article 81 or 82. We also have dates of Court judgments
for 74 infringements (38 annulments), as well as exact dates of surprise inspections for 59
infringements.
Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the ﬁrms in our sample, and indicates the type of antitrust
infringement as well as the dates of the relevant events.
The ﬁrms in our sample are quoted on diﬀerent stock exchanges. The majority are quoted
in Frankfurt and Tokyo, followed by New York, London and Paris. The remaining stock
exchanges where the ﬁrms from our sample are quoted are Amsterdam, Korea, Hong Kong,
29We are aware that sample selection is a possible concern of our analysis, to the extent that publicly
quoted ﬁrms tend to be large, multi-product, and possibly multinational ﬁrms, for which the eﬀect of a ﬁne
related to one particular product and geographic market may well be smaller than for a smaller, single-
product ﬁrm operating in a domestic market. However, it should also be recalled that the Commission
can impose ﬁnes up to 10% of the total (world) turnover of a ﬁrm, and that proportionality is one of the
most important criteria in calculating ﬁnes, so that other things being equal a larger multi-product and
multinational ﬁrm would generally be given a larger ﬁne.
30One of the ﬁrms in our sample, BASF, was involved in 5 infringements; 2 ﬁrms, Solvay and Bayer were
involved in 4 infringements; 7 ﬁrms were involved in 3 infringements; and the remaining ﬁrms were involved
in two or one infringement.
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Figure 2. Timeline
Singapore, Stockholm, Oslo, Brussels, Copenhagen, Milan, Luxembourg, Taiwan, Malaysia,
Athens and Vienna.
3.2. Event Study Methodology and Estimation Procedure. The central concept
in the event study methodology is the eﬃcient market hypothesis (EMH). Under this hy-
pothesis, the price of the security reﬂects the value to investors of all the relevant available
information about the fundamentals of the ﬁrm. Moreover, under the EMH, any news about
the fundamentals are immediately reﬂected in the share price.
The question that the event study attempts to answer is: what is the value of a change
of a particular fundamental. Under the EMH, if we knew the exact time in which the news
became available to investors and the security price that would have prevailed in the absence
of this news we could compute the value of the change of the fundamental that is reﬂected
in the news, as the diﬀerence between the counterfactual and the actual price.
We use standard event study methodology to estimate the eﬀect of the three above
mentioned events (news about the four events) in the antitrust investigation on the value of
the ﬁrm. Our main references for the event study methodology are Campbell et al. (1997)
and MacKinlay (1997).31
To obtain a counterfactual return we use a simple market model of returns:32
(44) Riτ = αi + βiRmτ + ǫiτ,
where Riτ and Rmτ are the period-τ returns on security i and the leading index of the stock
exchange where the security is quoted, respectively. We compute the returns as lnPit −
lnPit−1, where Pit is the price of the share on trading day t.
31See also Brown and Warner (1980, 1985).
32A convenient assumption that we will make is that the (N × 1) vector of asset returns, Rt, is inde-
pendently multivariate normally distributed with mean µ and covariance matrix Ω for all t. Under this
assumption, given that the model is correctly speciﬁed, the abnormal returns, conditionally on the market
return, are jointly normally distributed. This result is the basis of our inference.
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Figure 2 illustrates our approach. We deﬁne τ = 0 as the event date, τ = T2 to τ = T3
form the event window and the periods from τ = T0 through τ = T1 form the estimation
window. Let L1 = T1−T0+1 and L2 = T3−T2+1. We estimate parameters αi and βi for the
ﬁrm i security using 101 trading days in the period T0 = −120 to T1 = −20, except in the
case of the Commission Decision, where we use the window from T0 = −130 to T1 = −30.33
Then we use the estimated model as the model of counterfactual returns in the periods of














m are L2 × 1 vectors of actual returns on the security i and of the leading
index of the stock market where i is quoted.

















i ˆ Θi (47)
where R⋆
i is a (L2 × 1) vector of event window returns and X⋆
i is a (L2 × 2) matrix of ones
and event window market returns. ˆ Θi is the vector of parameter estimates [ˆ αi ˆ βi]′.
Under the null hypothesis “the abnormal returns for an individual security are equal to

















where I is an L2 × L2 identity matrix.
We aggregate individual daily abnormal returns by averaging them over securities and










and correspondingly the variance is
(51) Var[¯ ǫ






33In one of the robustness checks we look at a long event window for the Commission Decision (from
T2 = −25 to T3 = 3), and we need an estimation window which does not overlap with the event window.
We have veriﬁed that the results are not sensitive to variations in the estimation window.














Finally we also aggregate the average abnormal returns over the days of the event window
to obtain cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) for the event. With ι a unit (L2 ×1)
vector we have




(54) Var[CAR(τ1,τ2)] = ¯ σ
2(τ1,τ2) = ι
′Vι.
Again, ¯ σ2(τ1,τ2) is unknown and we use its consistent estimate













to test the null hypothesis.34
As an alternative speciﬁcation, to verify the robustness of our results, we use the mean
model, where the mean return of the individual security is used as the counterfactual return.
In this case the model is simply Riτ = αi + ǫiτ. This does not introduce changes in the
computation of the test statistics, except that we have to adjust the matrices X and X⋆
so that now they are vectors of ones of dimensions L1 and L2, respectively. In principle, it
is possible that a change in the share price of a very large ﬁrm may cause a change in the
relevant stock market index, giving rise to endogeneity problems. Using the mean model
rather than the market model avoids this problem. In Section 4.2 we estimate the mean
model to deal with this issue.
4. Results
In this Section, we ﬁrst describe our main results, then we report the various robustness
checks we have carried out, and ﬁnally we discuss the issue of cross-sectional correlation and
argue that it is not a problem in our case.
Summary statistics for abnormal returns in the estimation and event periods for all events
are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
34The distributional result is for large samples and is not exact because an estimator of the variance
appears in the denominator.
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We report abnormal returns for the three events for an event window period of eleven
days, together with their J-statistics in Table 3.35 All tests are one-sided unless speciﬁcally
stated otherwise.
Raid Comm.Dec. Annul. Upheld
N 59 147 38 36
mean −0.002 −0.00081 0.0019 −0.00014
Std.Dev. 0.0057 0.0054 0.0074 0.0057
min −0.024 −0.028 −0.0069 −0.015
Q1 −0.0048 −0.0028 −0.0014 −0.003
median −0.002 −0.00083 0.00079 −0.0003
Q3 0.0011 0.0024 0.0027 0.003
max 0.014 0.014 0.033 0.016
Table 1. Summary of abnormal returns in the event window
Raid Comm.Dec. Annul. Upheld
mean 3.61E−20 −3.17E−20 3.85E−20 −2.94E−21
Std.Dev. 1.84E−19 2.40E−19 2.74E−19 2.32E−19
min −3.93E−19 −1.03E−18 −5.32E−19 −4.53E−19
Q1 −5.38E−20 −1.09E−19 −8.48E−20 −1.48E−19
median 2.01E−20 −4.29E−21 4.29E−20 −3.17E−20
Q3 1.74E−19 8.90E−20 1.43E−19 6.65E−20
max 4.75E−19 6.04E−19 7.51E−19 6.41E−19
Table 2. Summary of abnormal returns in the estimation window
Abnormal return on the day of the raid is negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting a 1.04% drop in the ﬁrm’s share price the very same day the dawn raid is carried
out. This implies a very quick relay of the news to investors. A large number of studies
indicate that stock markets react very quickly to unexpected news.36 Similarly, negative
35In our sample the share prices data for three of the ﬁrms were no longer available in our database
at the time of the decision of the Courts, even though these were available at the time of the Commission
Decision.
36Brooks et al. (2003) investigate a sample of 21 fully unexpected negative news events - such as the
Exxon-Valdez oil disaster, plant explosions, plane crashes, deaths of executives - and ﬁnd that share prices
fall by an average of 1.6% after a mere 15 minutes. They stress that they ﬁnd longer response times (!) than
reported by previous studies.




Raid 59 J Com.D. 147 J Annul. 38 J Uphd 36 J
t= -5 0.00056 0.23 -0.00285* -1.59 -0.00317 -0.94 -0.00299 -0.87
t= -4 0.00389* 1.62 -0.00113 -0.63 0.00273 0.81 -0.00148 -0.43
t= -3 -0.00296 -1.23 1e-05 0.01 0.00514* 1.51 -0.00218 -0.64
t= -2 -0.00187 -0.78 -0.00041 -0.23 0.00436* 1.29 0.00078 0.23
t= -1 0.00173 0.72 -0.00038 -0.21 0.0027 0.8 -0.0023 -0.67
t= 0 -0.01041*** -4.32 -0.00248* -1.38 0.00047 0.14 -0.00301 -0.87
t= 1 -0.00252 -1.05 -0.00117 -0.66 0.00803*** 2.39 0.00584** 1.7
t= 2 -0.00488** -2.03 0.00118 0.66 0.00179 0.53 0.00131 0.38
t= 3 -0.00448** -1.86 0.0019 1.06 0.00086 0.25 -0.00169 -0.49
t= 4 -0.00014 -0.06 -0.00155 -0.86 0.0012 0.36 0.00127 0.37
t= 5 -0.00102 -0.42 -0.00201 -1.12 -0.00319 -0.95 0.00291 0.84
Cum -0.02208*** -2.64 -0.00888* -1.43 0.02093** 1.78 -0.00153 -0.13
Table 3. Summary of results
returns of 0.49% and 0.45% two and three days after the raid are signiﬁcant at the level of
5%. If we aggregate the abnormal returns over the window of Table 3, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
negative returns for the dawn raid, with an overall eﬀect of the raid amounting to a 2.21%
drop in the ﬁrm’s stock market valuation.
In the column for the Commission Decision we have negative abnormal returns of 0.28%
and 0.25%, signiﬁcant at the level of 10% ﬁve days before the event and on the day of the
event. The cumulative average abnormal return over the 11-day window is at −0.89% and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the level of 10%.
The last two columns in Table 3 show the eﬀects of the Court judgments. We deﬁne as
“annulments” all judgments which either annul the ﬁne or reduce it by more than 50%, and
“upheld” all remaining judgments.
In the column for the Court’s annulment we have weakly signiﬁcant positive abnormal
returns two and three days before the date of the judgment of the Court, which may indicate
that a favourable decision was expected by investors, and a strongly signiﬁcant positive ab-
normal return a day after the annulment of 0.8% and a positive cumulative average abnormal
return over the event window of 2.09%, which is signiﬁcant at the level of 5%.
Finally, in the columns for upheld decisions, we ﬁnd a positive abnormal return a day
after the decision, which is not an expected result. However, cumulatively, the negative
average abnormal return is not signiﬁcant at any acceptable level of signiﬁcance.
These are the base results. We now discuss them more thoroughly and reﬁne our esti-
mates, dealing with each of the antitrust events in turn.
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4.1. Robustness of the results.
4.1.1. Results for cartels only. First of all, note that our sample is composed of diﬀerent
types of antitrust infringements. It may be legitimate to wonder to what extent the results
are aﬀected by such diﬀerences. To dispel doubts, we select the sub-sample of cartel cases
(itself a subset of article 81 cases), which accounts for more than 4/5 of the whole sample,
and carry out the same analysis executed above. The results are described in Table 4, which
shows that the results are very similar to those obtained for the whole sample. We have not
carried out estimates for the sub-sample of non-cartel cases because they involve very few
cases.
Raid 51 J Com.D. 122 J Annul. 38 J Uphd 36 J
t= -5 -0.00033 -0.12 -0.00337* -1.64 -0.00397 -1.13 -0.0022 -0.47
t= -4 0.00426* 1.57 -0.00207 -1 0.00376 1.06 -0.00109 -0.24
t= -3 -0.00337 -1.25 0.00038 0.19 0.00626** 1.77 -0.00478 -1.03
t= -2 -0.00175 -0.65 0.00029 0.14 0.00496* 1.41 0.00119 0.25
t= -1 0.00374* 1.38 -0.00031 -0.15 0.00232 0.65 -0.00455 -0.98
t= 0 -0.01264*** -4.67 -0.00321* -1.55 -2e-04 -0.06 -0.00263 -0.56
t= 1 -0.00309 -1.14 -0.00173 -0.84 0.00793** 2.26 0.00989** 2.13
t= 2 -0.00371* -1.37 0.00116 0.56 0.0017 0.48 0.00216 0.47
t= 3 -0.00473** -1.75 0.00248 1.2 0.00018 0.05 -0.0014 -0.3
t= 4 -0.00071 -0.26 -0.00193 -0.94 0.0015 0.43 -0.00094 -0.2
t= 5 1e-05 0 -0.00293* -1.43 -0.00274 -0.78 0.00514 1.11
Cum -0.0223*** -2.38 -0.01125* -1.57 0.02171** 1.77 8e-04 0.05
Table 4. Summary of results for article 81 cases only
4.1.2. Dawn Raids. Inspecting back issues of the Financial Times we were unable to ﬁnd
any evidence of a surprise inspection not being a genuine surprise. Thus, we take a shorter
window of 5 days (-1..+3 days) for this event to increase the power of the test.
For this window, the cumulative abnormal return is −2% with a J value of −3.75, which
gives a statistical signiﬁcance at the level of 1%. The signiﬁcant negative abnormal return
is robust to variations in the size of the event window.
As a further robustness check of our results, we inspect abnormal returns for individual
ﬁrms. Most of the ﬁrms have negative abnormal returns, of which 5 are statistically signiﬁ-
cant in the 5-day event window. One of the ﬁrms from the sample had a positive signiﬁcant
abnormal return. Figure 3 depicts standardized abnormal returns for individual ﬁrms. The
solid line represents a standard normal distribution. On the vertical axis are the indices of
ﬁrms ordered by the size of the abnormal returns and on the horizontal axis are abnormal




returns. From the ﬁgure we can see that the normal distribution ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of abnormal returns.

































































Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for individual ﬁrms for Surprise
Inspection(T2 = −1 T3 = 4)
Additionally, we plot abnormal individual cumulative returns for each ﬁrm for 5 days
before the dawn raid and 5 days after the dawn raid in Figure 5. Next to each of the lines
depicting diﬀerences are indices of the ﬁrms, and on the horizontal axis are cumulative returns
to individual securities for the ﬁve-day windows before and after the event. The dashed lines
represent the securities for which the cumulative abnormal return in the window after the
raid was higher than the cumulative abnormal return before the raid and the solid line is for
the ﬁrms for which the opposite is true. It can be seen that only for 19 out of 59 ﬁrms are
the lines dashed, i.e. their returns are higher after the raid. Moreover, the largest diﬀerences
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Figure 4. Empirical distribution of cumulative average abnormal returns for
Surprise Inspection (sum over 5 periods).
among these ﬁrms tend to be smaller than the largest ones among ﬁrms whose returns are
lower after the raid.
We also inspect the empirical distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns for our
estimation window. For this purpose we compute abnormal returns using a moving window
of the same size as the event window over the periods of the estimation window. We move
the ﬁrst date of the hypothetical event window from T0 = −130 until T1 − L2 = −14 to
obtain L1 − L2 = 117 hypothetical cumulative average abnormal returns. The distribution
of these returns gives us an estimate of the distribution of abnormal returns under the null
hypothesis. This distribution is depicted by a solid line in Figure 4. The dashed lines
represent the normal distribution.
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Figure 5. Before and after the event cumulative average abnormal returns
for Surprise Inspection (before: -5..-1; after: 0..4)
The empirical distribution of cumulative average abnormal returns is not too far from
normal. In the ﬁgure the 0.025th and 0.975th quantiles of the distribution are represented
by solid vertical lines. It can be seen that the cumulative average abnormal return from the
event window (−0.02) falls well outside the acceptance region if we accepted the empirical
distribution as the true one under the null hypothesis. We view these results as an additional
conﬁrmation of the of signiﬁcance of the J value and the signiﬁcance of the negative eﬀect
of the surprise inspection on the value of the ﬁrm.
Given that there are good reasons to believe that the surprise inspection is really un-
expected, and under the assumption of EMH, we can interpret the abnormal return in the
window as the overall loss in the ﬁrm’s value (due to expected ﬁnes, termination of proﬁtable
activities and so on) brought about by the Commission’s investigation.
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One of the possible sources of information to investors that the Commission would start
an investigation is when an investigation on the same infringement is already under way in
the US. We have therefore excluded the observations for which we know that an antitrust
procedure had already started in the US and this information was publicly accessible at
the time of the raid by the Commission. The results we obtain with this restricted sample
with 48 observations are similar to those obtained using the whole sample. For the 4-day
window we have for surprise inspections a cumulative abnormal return of about -1.7% with
the J-statistic of -3.15, which indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the level of 1%.37,38
4.1.3. Commission Decisions. It is somewhat surprising that the Commission Decision
results in a signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal return in the 11-day window, as we would expect
the market to incorporate expectations about it in the share price. To verify the robustness
of these results we plot the analogue of Figure 4 also for the Decision of the Commission
over the 11-day window. The empirical distribution (solid curve) and the normal distribution
(dashed) with the same variance and mean are depicted in Figure 6. The area to the left of the
ﬁrst solid vertical line denotes a rejection region at the level of signiﬁcance of 10% (one-sided
test). The cumulative abnormal return of −0.89% falls into the rejection region. However,
when we move to level of signiﬁcance of 5% the cumulative abnormal return falls just outside
the rejection region. This may be an indication that the results for the Commission Decision
are somewhat less clearcut and less robust for the 11-day window than the results for the
surprise inspection are.
Since we believe that there may be some informational leakages occurring prior to the
date of the Decision, we extend the estimation window to the periods from 25 days before the
event until 3 days after the event to try to account for this possibility. Cumulative average
(across ﬁrms) abnormal return for this event window is -0.024 and is signiﬁcant at 5% with
a J value of -2.23.
37US cases that we exclude in this way are: (Lysine) Archer Daniels Midland, Ajinomoto, Kyowa Hakko
Kogyo, Daesang; (Citric acid) Archer Daniels Midland, Bayer; (Graphite electrodes) SGL, Showa Denko
K.K., Tokai Carbon, Nippon Carbon, SEC, The Carbide Graphite Group; (Vitamins) BASF, Aventis,
Takeda, Merck, Daiichi, Lonza, Solvay, Eisai, Sumitomo, Tanabe Seiyaku, Roche; (Auction houses) Christie,
Sotheby; (Sorbates) Hoechst; (Specialty graphite) Carbone Lorraine, SGL. Note, however, that for only 11
of these excluded ﬁrms do we have a date of the dawn raid and data on share prices available, so that the
restricted sample has 48 observations.
38In a further check, we exclude those ﬁrms which have applied for leniency. This is because one may
think that if a ﬁrm has applied for leniency and revealed information about a cartel, there may be some
rumour in the market that an investigation may start soon. Again, the results for the dawn raid are very
similar: for the 11-day window we get a cumulative abnormal return of -2.4% with a J-statistic of -2.54, thus
signiﬁcant at the level of 1%.




























Figure 6. Empirical distribution of abnormal cumulative average returns for
Commission Decision (sum over 11 periods).
Similarly, as for the 11-day window we also depict the empirical distribution of cumula-
tive average returns for the 29-day moving window in Figure 7. This ﬁgure is the equivalent
of Figure 4, discussed above for the case of raids. The empirical distribution of cumulative
average abnormal returns for this case is not very far from normal, as can be seen by com-
paring the solid and the dashed curves. However, some concern about the validity of the
signiﬁcance of our results for the Commission Decision also for the 29-day event window re-
main, though the cumulative abnormal return in this case falls well into the rejection region
at a 5% two-sided test signiﬁcance.
Figure 8 depicts standardized abnormal returns for individual ﬁrms. The solid line repre-
sents a standard normal distribution. On the vertical axis are the indices of ﬁrms ordered by
the size of the abnormal returns and on the horizontal axis are abnormal returns. From the
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Figure 7. Empirical distribution of cumulative average abnormal returns for
Commission Decision (sum over 29 periods).
ﬁgure we can see that the normal distribution ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution of abnormal returns. However, it is again clear that the result for the Commission
Decision is not as strong as the one for the surprise inspection.
Overall, and albeit less robust and less statistically signiﬁcant than for the dawn raid, it
seems that the Commission Decision does have a negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s valuation. This
result begs certain questions, since the Decision comes after other events (such as the raid
and the Statement of Objections) which represent strong signals of the seriousness of the
investigation.
It is not impossible that this result is caused by sample selection. Our sample includes
only the cases where a negative Decision was reached (we do not have data for positive
Decisions, since as explained above the Commission does not issue a Decision if it decides
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Figure 8. Distribution of cumulative abnormal returns for individual ﬁrms
for Commission Decision (T2 = −25 T3 = 3)
not to pursue the case further). Thus, we only have a sub-sample of all the investigations.
Those (rare) cases in which a favorable Decision has been reached are not included and this
way the investors may be systematically negatively surprised by the negative Decision for
our sample. It is widely believed that the Commission seldom drops a case after a dawn raid
and a Statement of Objections, but it is diﬃcult to objectively assess the extent to which
this sample selection bias may be important.
4.1.4. Court judgments. As seen in Table 3 above for the sample of 38 observations
for ﬁrms whose ﬁne has been annulled by the Courts, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
average abnormal returns two and three days before the Court judgment and a day after the
judgement. The cumulative average abnormal return is 2.09%, which is signiﬁcant at the
level of 5%.
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On the other hand, for the sub-sample of cases for which the Court has upheld the Deci-
sion of the Commission, the cumulative average abnormal return is negative, and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
In general, therefore, the Court’s antitrust judgments do seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the ﬁrm’s stock market value, at least in the cases of favorable judgment for the ﬁrm.
The positive market reaction (2.09%) allows the ﬁrms to recover almost half of the market
value lost because of the dawn raid and the Commission decision (which amount to -4.5%).39
This means that the net eﬀect of the antitrust investigation and of an infringement
Decision is negative even after a Court judgment which annuls the ﬁne. This can be explained
by the fact that - as pointed out in the Introduction and conﬁrmed in the discussion in Section
6 - the ﬁne itself is only part of the loss that a ﬁrm may incur because of the investigation.
Suppose, for instance, that the judgment annuls the Commission decision for procedural
reasons; the ﬁrm has won the case, but still it is unlikely that it could continue a business
practice which is regarded as anticompetitive by the European Commission, and ceasing a
proﬁtable activity will entail a loss in market value. But even when the judgment is favorable
to the ﬁrm on the substance, the ﬁrm may still have incurred costs which it will not be able
to recover, such as legal costs and the costs entailed by having the management occupied on
antitrust rather than commercial matters.
As a check of robustness of our results we also plot empirical distributions of abnormal
returns from the estimation windows for the annulling (Figure 9) and upholding (Figure 10)
decisions, analogously as for the Raids and Commission Decisions. The empirical distribution
for annulling decision is bimodal and the cumulative abnormal return does not fall into the
5% (two sided) signiﬁcance rejection region of the empirical distribution. However, it does
fall into the 10% signiﬁcance rejection region. The plots roughly conﬁrm our inference using
theoretical distributions.
As a further check of robustness we varied the starting date and the length of the window
for these two events and found that results are relatively robust to these changes, with
abnormal return for annulment being signiﬁcantly positive at least at 10 % level and for the
upholding abnormal return remaining insigniﬁcant.
4.1.5. Expectations of investors about the Court judgment. It is conceivable that investors
are able to predict to some extent whether the Decision of the Commission will be annulled
by the Courts at the time of the raid or at the time of the Commission’s Decision. In that
case, we would expect the negative eﬀect to be absent or at least weaker than in the case
where the market expects the Decision to be upheld. For this purpose we re-estimate the
39We take here the values for the 5-day window for the raid and for the 29-day window for the Commission
Decision.






















Figure 9. Empirical distribution of cumulative average abnormal returns for
Court Annullment (sum over 11 periods).
eﬀects for the raid and the Decision of the Commission for two separate sub-samples, i.e. the
cases in which the Court ultimately annulled (or substantially reduced) the ﬁne, and those
in which the Court upheld (or only slightly reduced) them. The results are reported in Table
5.
For both the dawn raid and the Commission Decision we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant result for
the sub-sample of cases for which the Decision of the Commission was later annulled by the
Courts.
However, for the subsample of cases for which the Decision was later upheld we ﬁnd a large
negative and signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal return at the time of the dawn raid. At the
same time, the return for the Commission’s Decision is negative and signiﬁcant at the level of
10%. This, in comparison with the results for the Decisions which were later annulled, may
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Figure 10. Empirical distribution of cumulative average abnormal returns
for Court Upholding (sum over 11 periods).
be an indication that indeed the investors anticipate partially the infringements for which
the Commission has a ﬁrm case likely to be upheld by the court.
4.2. Possible sources of endogeneity and bias. The fact that the ﬁrms in our sample
are often big, established companies that enter in the composition of stock market indices,
which, in turn, appear as independent variables in the model of counterfactual returns, may
be a source of endogeneity bias in the estimates. As a further check of robustness of our
estimates, we ran regressions using the mean-model of the counterfactual, described at the
end of Section 3 above. The results go in the same direction, but the signiﬁcance levels are
- not surprisingly - lower than for the market model. The average abnormal return for a
surprise inspection and its J-value are −0.021 and −2.07, respectively. For the Decision of




RU 22 J CU 47 J RA 9 J CA 39 J
t= -5 0.00013 0.03 -0.0079** -2.03 0.01267** 2.24 -0.00135 -0.38
t= -4 0.00484 1.24 0.00321 0.82 0.00493 0.87 -0.00837*** -2.34
t= -3 -0.00404 -1.03 -0.00553* -1.42 7e-04 0.12 0.00359 1
t= -2 0.00131 0.33 0.00192 0.49 0.00678 1.2 -0.00235 -0.66
t= -1 0.00058 0.15 5e-04 0.13 -0.00747* -1.33 0.00271 0.76
t= 0 -0.01663*** -4.25 -0.00682** -1.74 -0.00608 -1.08 0.00114 0.32
t= 1 -0.00202 -0.51 -0.00153 -0.39 0.00073 0.13 -0.00222 -0.62
t= 2 -0.00808** -2.06 0.00155 0.4 0.00117 0.21 0.0012 0.34
t= 3 -0.00637* -1.63 0.00306 0.78 -0.01046** -1.86 0.0037 1.03
t= 4 -0.00538* -1.38 0.00056 0.14 0.00199 0.35 -0.00536* -1.48
t= 5 -0.00016 -0.04 -0.00086 -0.22 -0.01135** -2 -0.00357 -1
Cum -0.03583*** -2.63 -0.01184 -0.87 -0.00637 -0.33 -0.01088 -0.87
Table 5. Summary of results for (R)aid and (C)om. Decision when later
(U)pheld and (A)nnuled
the Commission, however, the average abnormal return cumulated over the same period as
for the market model estimates and the corresponding J-value are −0.005 and −0.71, and
are thus not signiﬁcant.
4.2.1. Cross-sectional correlation. In the presence of cross-sectional correlation the infer-
ence on the base of the derived J statistic may be biased upwards. The bias is a function
of the number of the observations in the sample and the average correlation coeﬃcient. In
an inﬂuential paper, Bernard (1987) gives some empirical evidence on the seriousness of
the problems of inference in the presence of cross-sectional correlation. He argues that the
problem can become serious at the values of mean correlation coeﬃcient of a magnitude of
around 0.2 for a sample of the size of ours.
Because the ﬁrms in a cartel typically operate in the same industry, and as they are
often raided on the same day (see Table A.1 in the Appendix), we have some clustering
of abnormal returns across ﬁrms. However, the extent of clustering for our sample is not
likely to cause a serious inference problem, according to Bernard’s results: in our case, the
mean correlation is 0.01, and is thus not likely to present a serious source of bias in our
estimations of the standard error. Moreover, the distribution of covariances, summarized
in Table 6 for all pairs of ﬁrms demonstrates that a relatively small fraction of all pairs of
surprise inspections exceeds the reference 0.2 correlation coeﬃcient for the mean correlation.
4.2.2. Structural breaks. One of the possible sources of bias in our estimates may also be
the changes in the legal regime (for example, changes in the harshness of the ﬁning policy),
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Quant. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
r2 -0.28 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.5
Table 6. Distribution of correlation between abnormal returns of ﬁrms
which could introduce one or more structural changes in the data-generating process. To
explore this issue we have plotted the estimated abnormal returns at the dates of the dawn
raids chronologically ordered, with time on the horizontal axis. It is clear from that ﬁgure
that it is hard to identify a structural break or a clear pattern of evolution of abnormal
returns in time.
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Figure 11. Abnormal returns by dates of dawn raids
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5. Inferences on the probability of a dawn raid and anticompetitive margin
proﬁts
Armed with the simple model presented in Section 2, we can now try to make some
exploratory inferences on two variables which are unknown to us, that is, the probability m
that a ﬁrm is investigated by the Commission, and the (inverse of the) anticompetitive proﬁts
ratio πC/πM. To do so, recall that our event study methodology has given us estimates of
the three changes in the ﬁrm’s value caused by the three diﬀerent antitrust events, and
corresponding in our model with the three equations (42),(39), and (36). Call our estimated














This is a system in three unknowns ((πC/πM),m,n), and several parameters for which we
have estimates (kR,kD,kA), we know the average value (F), or we can ﬁnd an independent
estimated value (p,q).
However, there are two problems with the ﬁrst equation of the system. First of all, we do
not know to what extent to trust the estimate on the eﬀects of the Court judgment because
we ﬁnd that only annulments have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s valuation,
whereas upheld judgments do not have any eﬀect. Second, the solution to the ﬁrst equation
would be   n = −1 + fkA + fq/kA. Unfortunately, given our estimates of f, q, and kA,   n
would turn out to be negative, which would not make sense.
Let us then disregard the ﬁrst equation and turn to the two last equations of the system,
to look for the solutions for (πC/πM) and m. Solving the system of the last two equations
we obtain:
  m =





(1 − kD)(1 − p)
(1 − p)(1 − δfq) + kD (n + p(1 − δfq))
. (59)
where   m ≥ 0 for δ ≥
kR(1−p(1−kD))
pkD and   m ≤ 1 for δ ≤
1−p(1−kD)
pkD (which is always satisﬁed
as
1−p(1−kD)
pkD > 1); and   πC
πM ≤ 1 is satisﬁed.
The following step is to use the values of the parameters obtained from our empirical
analysis to obtain   m and   πC
πM by applying the values so obtained. Table 7 summarizes the
estimated values.
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kR kD n f q p δ =   m   πC/πM
.021 .024 5 .019 .56 .69 .9 = .55 .71
.015 .024 5 .019 .56 .69 .9 = .68 .71
.021 .020 5 .019 .56 .69 .9 = .46 .75
.021 .024 2 .019 .56 .69 .9 = .55 .83
.021 .024 5 .010 .56 .69 .9 = .55 .69
.021 .024 5 .019 .45 .69 .9 = .55 .70
.021 .024 5 .019 .56 .60 .9 = .34 .76
.021 .024 5 .019 .56 .69 .85 = .52 .71
Table 7. Estimated values for diﬀerent parameters
The Table indicates the parameters used and the resulting estimated values of the prob-
ability of a dawn raid and of the inverse of the anticompetitive margin. The values in the
ﬁrst row represent our baseline values, while in each of the following rows we change (more
precisely, reduce) one parameter in turn.
This calibration exercise suggests that the probability that a ﬁrm which violates EU
competition law will be investigated with a probability between 30% and 70%, and that
the normal competitive proﬁts are between 65% and 85% of the anticompetitive proﬁts. Of
course, these are completely tentative results, but they may give an idea of the order of
magnitude of two variables which one would like to know for policy purposes.
The probability that a ﬁrm will be investigated by the Commission, m, necessarily ap-
pears in discussions on the desirable level of antitrust ﬁnes for cartels (deterrence requires
the ﬁne to be at least as high as the ratio between the proﬁt gains from cartels over the
probability that a cartel will be discovered and successfully prosecuted), but it is impossible
to observe, since we cannot know the proportion of ﬁrms infringing the law over the whole
population of ﬁrms.
As for the gap between competitive and supra-competitive proﬁts, it may help us under-
stand the eﬀects that antitrust actions have on prices. Let us brieﬂy illustrate a simple way
to do so, in which we refer to a cartel infringement, where there is a positive relationship
between anticompetitive proﬁts and prices (in abusive cases, e.g. predation cases, it is also
possible that higher anticompetitive proﬁts may correspond to lower prices).
Finally, it can be checked that for the range of parameter values used in the Table 7,
and for the estimated values of m and πC/πM, the actual ﬁne f is well below the minimum
ﬁne f∗ which would ensure deterrence (see expression (43)). In other words, the estimated
values are consistent with the ﬁrm having chosen to violate antitrust laws.
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This can be also seen as indirect evidence that antitrust ﬁnes are too low. Suppose for
instance that n = 2,q = .56,p = .69,δ = .9,m = .55,πC/πM = .83: the minimum ﬁne
needed to achieve deterrence should be f∗ = 26%, rather than 1.9% as it is in our sample!40
Of course, our estimates should not be taken too literally, but the order of magnitude of
the diﬀerence between optimal ﬁne and actual ﬁne is so large that it is indeed suggestive
of under-deterrence. Fortunately, the European Commission has introduced in 2006 new
guidelines which will lead to the imposition of much higher ﬁnes.
Inference on prices. Assume an extremely simple model with perfectly symmetric ﬁrms and
where the competitive price (that is, the price at the equilibrium absent the anticompetitive
practice) is determined by a mark-up   over marginal costs. For simplicity, assume away
ﬁxed costs and assume that marginal costs are constant and equal to c. Then the competitive
price pc is given by:
(60) pc = c(1 +  ).
In this extremely simple model (in which we abstract from the incentive compatibility
constraints for collusion), we assume that the (industry-wide) cartel allows competing ﬁrms
to increase the market price above the competitive level, by a factor k, which we call the
price overcharge. The collusive price will then be:
(61) pm = pc(1 + k) = c(1 +  )(1 + k).
Note, however, that an increase in prices will not generally be followed by an equally-
proportionate increase in proﬁts, since a price increase will decrease demand.41 Assume a
constant demand elasticity e, which can be written as:




where qm is the quantity sold under cartel, and qc is the quantity sold under ”competitive”
conditions.
Some algebra shows that:
(63) qm = qc(1 − ek).
40If n = 10, and all other parameters unchanged, then f∗ = 7.1%. But note that if n was equal to 10,
then the estimated values of m and πC/πM would decrease.
41Of course, proﬁts might also be aﬀected through a change in costs (for instance if production falls
below optimal capacity) but these are absent here due to the constant marginal costs assumption.
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s e m =   k1   k2
.7 .8 .3 = .14 .88
.6 .8 .3 = .25 .77
.7 .5 .3 = .12 1.64
.7 .8 .2 = .09 .99
Table 8. Tentative estimates of parameters
The ﬁrm’s ”competitive” proﬁts are:
(64) π
C = (pc − c)qc = c qq
while the cartel proﬁts will be equal to:
(65) π
M = (pm − c)qm = c(1 − ek)(k +   + k )qc.





(1 − ek)(  + k + k )
.
In the previous section, we have obtained estimates of (πC/πM). Call s ≡   πC/πM such
estimate. It is then possible to solve equation (66) for k to obtain:
  k =
s(1 +  (1 − e)) ±
 
(1 +  (1 − e))s2 − 4 (1 − s)es(1 +  )
2es(1 +  )
.
Call   k1 and   k2 the lower and higher root respectively. We expect that the rational
ﬁrms would choose the lower of the roots as overcharge, not least because they do not
want to attract the attention of the antitrust authority. We use tentative estimates for the
parameters, reported in Table 8, to get an idea of the order of magnitude of the price changes.
Given that the ﬁrms choose the lower of the roots for overcharge we estimate that the
price overcharge would be between 9-25%.





We have estimated, by using event study techniques, the impact of various events in an
antitrust investigation on a ﬁrm’s stock market value. Our main result is that the dawn
raid (i.e., the surprise inspection of the ﬁrm’s premises carried out by the Commission),
which is the ﬁrst piece of information received by market operators indicating that the
European Commission intends to investigate an antitrust infringement, has a strong and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s share price: on average, on the same day as the
dawn raid the ﬁrm’s return is around 1% lower than the counterfactual return provided by
the market model; furthermore, the cumulative average abnormal return due to the dawn
raid is approximately 2.1% over the 5 days window.
Somewhat surprisingly, since one might expect that after the dawn raid the market would
be able to anticipate that the antitrust investigation will lead to serious consequences for the
ﬁrm, we ﬁnd that the Commission’s infringement Decision also has some eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s
valuation. Although the evidence is less clearcut and robust than the one obtained for the
dawn raid (although this is also due to the fact that the Commission Decision, unlike the
dawn raid, is preceded by rumors), we ﬁnd that a negative Decision results in a (statistically
signiﬁcant) cumulative abnormal return of about −2.4%.
Our ﬁnal result is that the judgment by the Court annulling (or considerably reducing) the
ﬁne has a positive impact on the ﬁrm’s market valuation (the cumulative average abnormal
return is about 2.1%), whereas a judgment which upholds the ﬁne results in an insigniﬁcant
decrease in the ﬁrm’s valuation.
Deterrence is determined by the probability that an infringement will be uncovered and
prosecuted by the Commission multiplied by the costs that the ﬁrm incurs if the investigation
does take place. The former factor is diﬃcult to estimate, and our paper is silent on this.
But our analysis tells us something about the latter, which could be obtained as an estimated
loss of 4.5% of the ﬁrm’s stock market value, calculated by adding the loss in stock market
value due to the dawn raid (-2.1%) and the loss due to the formal Decision (2.4%).
However, one should not conclude that antitrust penalties amount to a loss of 4.5% of
stock market value. Indeed, the ﬁne represents only part of this capitalization loss, the
remaining part resulting predominantly from the (likely) cessation of a lucrative activity -
which cannot be considered a penalty for an infringement. In the US, Bosch and Woodrow
(1991) estimated that ﬁnes and damages account for 13% of the total loss in the ﬁrm’s stock
market value. In our case, the ﬁne represents on average around 2% of the ﬁrms’ market
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coef. Raid t coef. Decision t
const. -0.018 -2.57 -0.026 -2.76
ﬁne/cap -0.062 -0.41 0.041 0.29
Table 9. Regression of abnormal return on ﬁne/cap ratio
value as reported by Datastream.42 Since the estimated total negative eﬀect on the share
price is about 4.5%, the ﬁne accounts for less than 50% of the total loss.43
The higher weight of the ﬁnes in the total loss in the ﬁrm’s value we obtain for our EU
data is consistent with the existence of treble damages in the US (but not in the EU), which
add to the negative eﬀects of the ﬁnes and the likely cessation of lucrative activities.
To determine whether the magnitude of a negative market reaction at the time of the
surprise inspection depends on the relative magnitude of the ﬁne later imposed on the ﬁrm
by the Commission, we regress the abnormal returns on a constant and the ratio of the ﬁne
over the total capitalization of the ﬁrm. The results are reported in Table 9. We ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on the relative size of the ﬁne is a small negative number for raid and a small
positive number for the commission which are not signiﬁcant even at the level of 10%. This
may be seen as a further indication that the ﬁnes are not the main component of the cost of
an antitrust investigation.
In recent years, there has been a wide debate in the EU on how to increase deterrence
of anticompetitive practices, in particular cartels.44 The fact that several ﬁrms are repeat
antitrust oﬀenders, and the fact that the breach of competition laws rarely triggers top
management changes in ﬁrms, may be suggestive of a scarce deterrence eﬀect of antitrust
penalties.
42We were unable to retrieve data for capitalisation at the date of the raid; instead we have the out-
standing value of shares that we use in computation of abnormal returns for the given ﬁrm and capitalisation
in September 2006. To approximate capitalisation at the time of the raid we multiply the outstanding shares
value at the time of the raid with the ratio of capitalisation in 2006 and outstanding value of the same share
edition in 2006.
43If one took the most conservative estimate of the eﬀects of the investigation, and thus did not consider
the drop due to the Commission’s Decision, one would conclude that ﬁnes would account for almost the total
drop in share prices.
44Several countries have increased ﬁnes for antitrust infringements, and some (for instance the UK) have
introduced criminal penalties. The European Commission has launched an initiative to facilitate the use
of private actions for damages and has just revised its Guidelines for imposing ﬁnes with the objective of
increasing their deterrent eﬀect (see footnote 6 above).




So far, though, there has been no attempt to study the extent to which EU investigations
and penalties have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the ﬁrms infringing competition laws. This paper’s
objective was precisely to help quantify these eﬀects.
It is diﬃcult to say whether the estimated eﬀects of the antitrust investigations on the
ﬁrms’ share prices should be considered large or small. To help make comparisons, it may be
useful to compare our results with those works estimating the eﬀects of events with charac-
teristics similar to those of antitrust events. Gunthorpe (1997) uses event study techniques
to investigate the eﬀect of the ﬁrst announcement in the Wall Street Journal that a ﬁrm is
involved in some form of illegal behavior, such as racketeering, patent infringements, or fraud
(for instance, false advertising and securities fraud). She ﬁnds that on the very same day of
the announcement, the average abnormal return is -1.325%, and that the cumulative average
abnormal return on an 11-day event window (like the one we use in Table 2) is -2.3%. The
magnitude of these eﬀects (which on average probably concern legal infringements of less
gravity than antitrust ones) is similar to that of the dawn raids, which are also unexpected
events.
Since Commission Decisions, and to a minor extent the Court judgments, are not entirely
unexpected events, we need to ﬁnd events sharing these features for the sake of making com-
parisons. MacKinlay (1997) analyzes the eﬀects on share prices of announcements that actual
earnings are more than 2.5% less than expected. On the same day as this announcement
is publicly made, the ﬁrm’s share drops by -.68%, while the cumulative average abnormal
return on the 41-day event window (comparable to the length of the long event window we
used for the Decision) is of about -1.26%. The estimated eﬀects of such relatively minor ’bad
news’ are therefore of an order of magnitude not so diﬀerent from the estimated eﬀects of the
news that the European Commission has decided to ﬁne a ﬁrm for an antitrust infringement.
Still, in our case the overall impact of the antitrust investigation is determined by the
sum of the eﬀects of the dawn raid and of the Decision, so the above comparisons taken
individually just give some idea of the magnitude of the eﬀects. Admittedly, therefore,
it is very diﬃcult to say anything on whether the estimated eﬀects are “large” or not, and
above all on whether they are suﬃcient to provide deterrence against anticompetitive actions.
Hopefully, this paper will promote discussion and more empirical works on this issue.
We also believe that our paper oﬀers some evidence on the eﬀectiveness of antitrust
intervention. Since most of the drop in the share prices we observe is not caused by the
ﬁnes, it must be due to the likely cessation of proﬁtable cartel activity (or other unlawful
business practices). In turn, this should imply that investors expect investigated and ﬁned
ﬁrms not to be able to sustain high prices any longer. Therefore, although we cannot oﬀer
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direct evidence on this issue, our paper indirectly suggests that antitrust intervention does
have an eﬀect on product market prices.




Cournot Duopoly with Switching Costs
1. Introduction
Since a series of pioneering work by Klemperer (1987a,b,c) and von Weizs¨ acker (1984)
it has been widely accepted by economists that costs incurred by consumers while changing
providers of goods and services play an important role in organization of industries. To
list just a few aspects, switching costs aﬀect competition intensity, attractiveness of entry,
collusion possibilities, and the market structure. The costs themselves originate from diﬀer-
ent sources. Klemperer (1987c) identiﬁed three types: learning costs, transaction costs and
artiﬁcial contractual costs.
Learning costs are the eﬀort and time spent to reach an operating level of knowledge of
special characteristics of the product that allows the consumer to use the product with the
same relative ease as previous product. An example are computer operating systems, which
are (arguably) functionally identical, but require diﬀerent speciﬁc knowledge. Transaction
costs arise, for example, while changing a bank account: it takes both time and eﬀort to close
one account and to open another. Contractual costs are caused by deliberate actions of ﬁrms
creating cost of switching away from the current provider. This type of costs is exempliﬁed
by frequent-ﬂyer programs. In total, it is hard to ﬁnd a market in which products do not
exhibit any of three types of switching costs. Klemperer and Farrell (2006) is a comprehensive
survey of the literature on switching costs. They deal mainly with the eﬀects of switching
costs on competition.
The economic literature identiﬁes two eﬀects that switching costs have on entry. On one
hand, they facilitate entry, as the incumbent is less interested in new customers. Without
discrimination between the old and the new customers the price will have to be lower for the
whole customer base, not only for the new customers. On the other hand, switching costs
facilitate entry deterrence, as the incumbent can use limit pricing more easily. In particular,
in the period of entry the entrant must price signiﬁcantly below the incumbent to attract
new consumers.
The former eﬀect dominates in the model of Farrell and Shapiro (1988). Their demand
stems from overlapping generations of buyers (in each period a cohort of young buyers enters
the market and lives for two periods). On the supply side there are two sellers. In this model
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the ﬁrm with attached customers specializes in serving them and concedes new buyers to
its rival. The switching costs lock in consumers and confer a signiﬁcant market power that
results in higher proﬁts. However, these higher proﬁts attract new entrants. Farrell and
Shapiro (1988) introduce barriers to entry in the form of economies of scale and because of
the eﬀect of switching costs that facilitate entry (may even lead to ineﬃciently high entry).
Klemperer (1987b) in a two period model with an isolated cohort shows, however, that the
incumbent may preempt entry by capturing a large market share or in other circumstances
by keeping a small customers base to remain an aggressive competitor.
Another problem discussed in the literature is the eﬀect of switching costs on the compet-
itiveness of markets. Klemperer (1987a) builds a two-period diﬀerentiated-products duopoly
with switching costs and ﬁnds that the non-cooperative equilibrium in an oligopoly with
switching costs leads to vigorous competition for market share in the early stages of the
market’s development. This results in the evolution of prices whereby the price in the ﬁrst
period is lower than the price in subsequent periods. This is because the ﬁrms compete for
market share that is valuable later. However, the prices in this model may be higher in all
periods than in competition without switching costs.
Padilla (1992) shows that switching costs always relax competition compared to the
situation with no switching costs. However, the level of competition is not a monotonic
function of switching costs. In his model not all customers are informed about the prices
of both sellers and all equilibria are mixed strategy equilibria in prices. The larger ﬁrm
sets a higher price with a higher probability than the smaller ﬁrm. There is a tendency to
symmetric market shares as the bigger ﬁrm sets a higher price more often but in equilibrium
market shares of ﬁrms are asymmetric. He thus ﬁnds that competition with switching costs
will lead to equilibria where the ﬁrms naturally have asymmetric market shares.
Similarly, in the present model the ﬁrms have asymmetric market shares in equilibrium.
However, it is not the fact that the ﬁrms use mixed strategies in equilibrium that generates
this result. I assume that the ﬁrms start the game with exogenously allocated customer
bases that need not be the equilibrium ones. Solving the game for all such allocations the
resulting equilibria are characterized. In the present model the information is complete and
perfect and pure strategy equilibria asymmetric equilibria exist also for a subset of initially
symmetric market shares.
In an attempt to characterize industry dynamics Padilla (1992) interprets the mixed
strategy random equilibrium realizations of very low prices as sales or stochastic price wars.
In his model, when both ﬁrms set a low price as a realization of random equilibrium strategies,
price wars obtain; when only one of the ﬁrms sets a low price, unilateral sales occur. I
believe that the resulting ﬂuctuating price series that this model generates do not reﬂect




well the observed stability of industry prices. Moreover, his model cannot explain persistent
asymmetric market shares that we observe in many industries. Namely in Padilla (1992) there
is a persistent tendency to symmetric market shares and asymmetries will only result from
randomization over strategies in equilibrium. The model of this paper, on the other hand,
captures both these features of reality, relative stability of prices, and persistent asymmetries
in market shares.
The focus of the paper, however, is the short-term industry dynamics rather than long-
term outcome analyzed in the most of the literature. Switching costs allow for history
dependence, which plays a crucial role in the short term. Despite the focus on short term
dynamics I show that convergence to the classical symmetric Cournot equilibrium does not
happen even in an inﬁnitely repeated game even if switching costs are small.
I model the industry by a one-shot game where the ﬁrms simultaneously decide on the
quantities they produce. Demand is given exogenously by a linear function. 1 I am looking
for subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
For very small initial output levels, including zero output for both ﬁrms, unique symmetric
equilibrium obtains, where the quantity produced increases from the initial one, is equal in
subsequent periods, and lower than the quantity produced in equilibrium in the absence of
switching costs. This is similar to the result of Klemperer (1987a) where the competition is
most intensive in the initial period. When we increase the initial quantities of either of the
ﬁrms we also obtain asymmetric equilibria. To the best of my knowledge, this result is not
present in the literature to date. Given that quantity increases are relatively less attractive
with a higher customers base, the initial allocations in which both ﬁrms have high outputs
result in the set of equilibria where the quantities are equal to the initial allocation. These
are situations in which the incentives for both ﬁrms to harvest existing customer base are
stronger than the incentives for expansion.
An interpretation of these results is in the choice of entry mode when one can opt for an
early entry with a limited capacity or for a later entry with a large capacity. The latter may
be preferred in industries with switching costs even if after the entry capacity expansion is
allowed. Namely, for large enough switching costs and captured market, the incentives for
expansion are absent, and the ﬁrm might get locked in a less proﬁtable equilibrium.
Interesting asymmetric equilibria obtain when either one or both of the ﬁrms have an
initially allocated output in the medium range (The medium range shall be characterized
1We can think of this demand as being generated by uniformly distributed customers with valuation
v and linear transportation costs. Only the farthest customers switch suppliers. A customer incurs ﬁxed
costs whenever he did not make a purchase from the same ﬁrm in the previous period. Thus, the costs
are incurred whenever the customer switches a ﬁrm or when he ﬁrst purchases the good. This is the same
demand as Klemperer (1987b).
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more precisely later). Each of the ﬁrms, given rival’s initial output wants to increase the
output - future proﬁt increases are attractive. However, if the rival increases the quantity
largely enough, lowering the price further, the ﬁrm no longer wants to increase the output
and prefers to keep a high present price and harvest existing customers. This results in an
asymmetric equilibrium where either of the ﬁrms ends up bigger, and the other does not
change output from the initial one.
The quantitative results of our analysis survive in a multi-period setting. Thus, this
model does not predict convergence to symmetric output allocations over time.
2. The Model
I consider a one-shot Cournot game with two ﬁrms, demand p(q) and production costs
C(q). Switching costs of changing a provider are s. The suppliers cannot discriminate
between diﬀerent consumers according to whether or not they have made the purchase in
the previous period. Thus, whenever the sellers want to expand the sales they have to oﬀer
a discount to all consumers. The formulation of demand is identical to Klemperer (1987b).
I add initial sales to the model, whereby the ﬁrms start playing the game with some history,
which proxies the customer base of the ﬁrm. The maximization problem of a seller is thus






























Ii captures the discount when the seller wants to increase sales from that of previous
period and q1
i denotes the volume of initial sales. The initial sales are treated as exogenous.
To be able to obtain analytical results I look at the linear demand p(q) = a − bq and linear


















Denote for convenience x = a−c
3b and S = s
3b. Next, ﬁx the strategy of ﬁrm A to q2
A. The
best response of the ﬁrm B given its initial sales q1

























The problem is concave in q1
B on each interval, so optima can separately be found and
then compared. Diﬀerentiation gives
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2 (3x − 3S − qA), q2
B > q1
B.
This condition simply states that in the second period the seller B, when he is expanding
the quantity will, given strategy of A, expand to 1
2(3x − 3S − (qA)). When B is contracting
sales, given strategy of A, he will set the quantity to 1
2(3x − (qA)). After plugging the cor-
responding expressions for the second period quantities into the conditions and the realizing











2 (3x − qA),
1
2 (3x − qA) ≤ qB;
q1
B, 1
2 (3x − 3S − qA) ≤ qB < 1
2 (3x − qA);
1
2 (3x − 3S − qA),
1
2 (3x − 3S − qA) > qB.
The superscript has been dropped for convenience, as now only initial sales are present
in the rhs.
The part of the best response function that is relevant for quantity increase is computed
under the assumption that it is optimal for a ﬁrm to increase the quantity. However, it may
not be so for output values close to the best response. The ﬁrm would in that case prefer not
to raise the quantity, because of the penalized price which it obtains in doing so. Therefore,
I compute the set of initial allocations for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between increasing
the quantity to best response and keeping it as it was before, and then deﬁne the global best








2 (3x − qA), 1
2 (3x − qA) ≤ qB;
qB, yB ≤ qB < 1
2 (3x − qA);
1









−3S + 6x − 2qj),
is the curve which characterizes the initial qi for each strategy qj for which the ﬁrm i is indif-
ferent between increasing the quantity and not changing it from the one initially allocated.
In Figure 1 these are plotted as dashed convex curves.
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as qi coordinate of the intersection of the higher best response line for ﬁrm j with the
















(−7S + 3x + 2
√
S2 + 3Sx)
is the qi coordinate of the intersection of lower best response of ﬁrm j with i’s indiﬀerence
set yi.
I proceed to ﬁnd the equilibria and characterize them in the following propositions. As-
sume in what follows, without loss of generality, that ﬁrm B never has higher initial sales
than ﬁrm A.
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game speciﬁed above is characterized
by the following strategy proﬁles:
(i)
(x − S,x − S) if qA,B ≤ ν, (77)









((qB ≤ yB) ∩ (yA ≤ qA ≤ x + S)) ∪ ((φ ≤ qA ≤ yA) ∩ (qB ≤ ν)),













qB) ∩ (x ≥ qB ≥ z); (81)
(iii)







Proof. The equilibrium is constructed from intersection of global best responses, as
outlined by (7). ￿
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Equations (77) and (78) characterize the two symmetric equilibria denoted, respectively,
by letters A and C in Figure 1. The ﬁrst equilibrium results from low, including 0, initial
sales for both sellers. In Figure 1 this initial allocation corresponds to the white area under
the diagonal close to the origin. Both ﬁrms increase the quantity but total sales in the
resulting equilibrium are low. Any other equilibrium in the model is characterized by higher
total sales. The second symmetric equilibrium (denoted by C in the ﬁgure) results from both
ﬁrms selling large volume in the previous period. This area of initial sales volumes is above
the horizontal dashed line through C. In this equilibrium both ﬁrms decrease the quantity
to the level of the equilibrium without switching costs. This is also the equilibrium where
total quantity sold is the highest.
Equations (79)- (81) characterize equilibria in which the initially smaller ﬁrm (weakly)
increases the quantity and the bigger one (weakly) decreases it. This type of equilibria
results when the asymmetry in initial sales is large and the the larger ﬁrm A’s sales exceed the
threshold deﬁned by yA. Equation (79) thus characterizes the unique asymmetric equilibrium
which in Figure 1 corresponds to the area (13) below the curve yb to the left of x + S.
Equation (80) in turn characterizes the equilibrium resulting from the bigger of the ﬁrms
inheriting large sales (in Figure 1 this means that A has sales beyond ˜ qA), whereas the smaller
ﬁrm had much smaller sales(B had initial sales below the dashed indiﬀerence curve or below
the dashed horizontal line denoted by z). In equilibrium, the bigger ﬁrm will decrease its
sales volume whereas the smaller one will increase it moderately. The equilibrium in the
Figure is now at the intersection of best response lines, denoted by B.
Equation (81) gives equilibrium sales volumes for initial allocations which in Figure 1 fall
into the region to the right of the higher of the best response lines for ﬁrm A and between the
horizontal lines through C and z. In this case the large ﬁrm, A, will decrease the quantity
the other ﬁrm will not change sales.
Equation (82) characterizes equilibrium resulting from levels of initial sales in the medium
range. In this case none of the ﬁrms has an incentive neither to increase nor to decrease
its sales from the initial ones. In the ﬁgure this set is represented by the grey central area.
Clearly for relatively high levels of initial sales the opportunity costs of expansion are high
for both ﬁrms and none of them has an incentive to increase sales.
As demonstrated earlier, at very low, including zero quantities in the ﬁrst period there is
only a symmetric equilibrium where both ﬁrms increase sales (the white area below the 45
degrees line close to the origin in the ﬁgure).
However, for a set of initial allocations where both ﬁrms still have relatively low, but at
least one of the ﬁrms has initial sales larger than ν, multiple equilibria may obtain. This
leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game speciﬁed above are character-
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(x − S) −
1
2
qB,qB) if (yA ≥ qA ≥ φ) ∩ (ν ≤ qB). (85)
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 1. ￿
Multiple equilibria arise because of the interaction between the strategies played by the
other player and incentives to increase the sales. A relatively large increase in sales by one of
the players may cause the other player to be better oﬀ not changing its sales from the initial
ones. For the set of initial sales which give multiple equilibria both ﬁrms are potentially
interested in increasing sales, and at least one does so. If both ﬁrms indeed increase sales,
this leads to a symmetric equilibrium. The larger, in our case ﬁrm A, however, has an
incentive to increase sales only as long as B does not choose a large increase in sales. As
A’s customers base is no longer very small it becomes optimal not to increase the quantity
for large increases in B’s quantity. In turn, large increase, as a response to a strategy of
no change of A for this strategy of B, becomes attractive for B. These strategic interactions
imply an additional asymmetric equilibrium in conjunction with the symmetric one.
The ﬁrst set of multiple equilibria which result from ﬁrm B being initially signiﬁcantly
smaller than A is characterized by (83), which can also be seen from the Figure 1. It is
obvious that either the ﬁrm B will be bigger in equilibrium or both ﬁrms will have equal
sales volumes at x − S.
Taking initial sales of B to be at the levels close to those of A we have 3 possible equilibria
- where either A or B has a higher output and a symmetric equilibrium with both ﬁrms having
equal outputs. In Figure 1 this set of initial sales volumes is denoted by (84). The resulting
equilibria are characterized by the corresponding equation.
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There is also a possibility of two asymmetric equilibria when sales volumes of the ﬁrms in
the initial period are close. In the ﬁgure this set is the region (19). The resulting equilibria
are characterized by the corresponding equation.
In line with the literature on the switching costs, the ﬁrm with a smaller initial market
share is relatively more aggressive. The reason is that the larger ﬁrm has greater incentives
to exploit its customer base and thus lacks incentives for costly expansion. In the present
model, however, we can trace the adverse eﬀect of aggressive strategies on the expansive
intentions of the other player and obtain asymmetric equilibria, even when the ﬁrms are
completely symmetric along all dimensions.
As the propositions make clear, equilibrium quantities depend on the initial allocation
of output between ﬁrms in the presence of switching costs. The outcomes are sometimes
sensitive to small changes in the initial conditions. This sensitivity is reﬂected in the abrupt
changes of the equilibrium quantities for small changes in initial sales volumes of one or both
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ﬁrms. Together with possible multiple equilibria, this implies that an attempt at prediction
of the industry structure outcomes in reality with switching costs may not be a very fruitful
operation. This has been a recurrent, but never satisfactorily explained argument in the
literature on switching costs.
I have shown that for a one period model asymmetric equilibria will result for a subset
of asymmetric (and a subset of symmetric) initial sales allocations for otherwise identical
ﬁrms. In the presence of switching costs this is a normal competitive outcome, which need
not be a red ﬂag for the antitrust authority. This is relevant, particularly because we often
observe persistent asymmetries in market shares in reality and this seems to often be a great
concern for a regulator or a competition authority.
Further, even if a ﬁrm has larger sales (larger customers base) initially, this may not
be true in equilibrium. In the present model often it is the initially smaller ﬁrm, which is
more aggressive, that has higher equilibrium sales. Taking this result to reality, we should
not be surprised if such industries are exhibiting occasional volatile changes in leadership.
Moreover, the result should serve as a warning for the regulator from hastily accepting a
paternalistic attitude towards the small ﬁrms in industries characterized by switching costs.
3. Comparative statics
It is clear that the conventional Cournot duopoly is a limiting case in the model when
switching costs tend to zero. The grey area of inaction on the Figure is growing larger with
increase of costs s. This is very intuitive: none of the ﬁrms wants to adjust its position if the
adjustment is costly. Notice that for very high costs there is no initial position that makes
ﬁrms increase their sells even from zero - in such case entry is successfully blocked.
The size of the market a obviously has the opposite eﬀect on the region where the ﬁrms
do not change their positions in equilibrium. The slope of demand function b matters for
this region in so far as it enters x and S, higher slop thus leading to smaller set of inaction.
This also seems intuitive, as more elastic demand is more attractive for price cuts holding
costs of switching constant.
Note also that the upper-right border of the grey region have the slope −1
2 and −2 re-
gardless of the parameters of the model. Size of the market, elasticity of demand, production
and switching costs all change position and size of the area of inaction, but do not change
its form. This feature is a result of the assumption that the two ﬁrms are identical apart
from initial positions.
The size of the region with multiple equilibria depends on how large is φ − ν. It can
be shown that this diﬀerence is increasing in S and decreasing in x. Hence, the eﬀect of
switching costs and other parameters on this region is similar to that on grey region.





Given that I have solved for all the initial allocations of consumers, the results can be
used to examine entry into an industry characterized by switching costs. The entrant that
does not face any sunk costs is equivalent to an incumbent which has no initial sales. Thus,
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to characterize the resulting equilibrium for any strictly positive
initial sales of the incumbent, ﬁrm A. Namely, equations (77), (79), (80), (83) contain all the
relevant information for entry analysis.
I start the discussion with monopolistic initial sales of the incumbent. Consider as mo-
nopolistic the points at zero production of the ﬁrm B between lower and best responses of




2(x − S),x + S
 
. In
such case the entry will involve the entrant setting the quantity equal to
3




which is the best response to monopolistic quantity qm
A. This can also be seen in equation
(79). The incumbent will not change its sales from the initial ones. The market share of the
incumbent in the new equilibrium will be, under the assumptions made, somewhat higher
than that of the entrant. The diﬀerence depends on how steep the best response is.
When we consider the initial sales of the incumbent below monopolistic, the entrant’s
equilibrium sales are higher. This is according to the same best response deﬁned in (79).
When the incumbent’s initial sales are below x − S, the entrant’s equilibrium market share
is actually higher than that of the incumbent.
However, if we consider very small initial sales of the incumbent (qA ≤ yA), the industry
will exhibit symmetric sales (x−S,x−S). This corresponds to equation (77) of Proposition
1. As a qualiﬁcation, there is also a small interval qA ∈ [ν,φ] that results in two equilibria:
symmetric (x − S,x − S) and asymmetric
 
qA, 3
2(x − S) − 1
2qA
 
. This can be seen from
equation (83) of proposition 2.
For larger than monopolistic initial sales of the incumbent, qA > x + S, its equilibrium
sales decrease. Despite this, the asymmetry in this case is maximal: the equilibrium is
(x + S,x − 2S), as can be seen from equation (80).
5. Dynamics
The previous results can be applied to get insights into the adjustment of market structure
to demand shocks. Initial sales in the model can be interpreted as the equilibrium sales
in the previous period characterized by initial demand. Suppose now that between the
periods a demand shock (symmetric or asymmetric) is realized, such that the new demand
is as in the model. In this manner low initial sales allocations (those close to the origin in
Figure 1) correspond to a positive shock in demand and the initial allocations with high sales
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correspond to negative demand shocks. This way any initial state can be chosen and the
adjustment to shocks analyzed.
Evolving industries and growing markets exhibit large potential size, and this corresponds
in the model to initial allocations at low sales close to the origin of the graph (increasing
the constant term in the demand function would have exactly such an eﬀect). On the other
hand, in the model shrinking markets would exhibit small potential size and accordingly
initial allocations further from the origin.
With this interpretation one can explore the implications of the model for industry dy-
namics. As shown in Proposition 1, relatively low initial sales and signiﬁcant asymmetries in
these give rise, in equilibrium, to large changes in sales by at least one of the sellers. Thus,
it follows from the model that we should not be surprised to observe sudden shifts in the
sales leadership in growing markets or after positive demand shocks. On the other hand,
such reversals would be less likely for industries where sellers are operating in stagnating
markets. The set of equilibria characterized by the proposition above also imply that these
are the situations in which persistent asymmetries in market shares are more likely.
In the markets with small potential size the model predicts that large initial asymmetries
will decrease in equilibrium through the smaller ﬁrm increasing its sales faster than the
bigger one. Once a ﬁrm locks in suﬃciently high a customers base the incentives for further
expansion are low and the model predicts convergence to stable market shares. Note that
the model does not predict that small asymmetries will decrease in such markets.
When the initial sales allocations are rather symmetric and shocks to the demand are
small, the model implies that neither of the ﬁrms will be changing the level of sales in
equilibrium. In this region the incentives of sellers to increase market share are weak. These
initial allocations can be interpreted as historical customer bases for mature markets along
the same lines as before. Thus in industries (markets) which are growing at slower rates the
model predicts more stable symmetric or asymmetric market shares.
There are at least two testable hypotheses that come out of this analysis. Firstly, we
are more likely to ﬁnd alternating leadership in the growing industries with switching costs.
Secondly, we should see stabilized market shares (symmetric or asymmetric) in mature in-
dustries.
6. Extension to multiple periods
In this section I extend the model to multiple (in fact, inﬁnitely many) periods to see if
it is robust to such a modiﬁcation. In general formulation, the optimization problem of the
ﬁrm A in an inﬁnitely repeated Cournot game with switching costs is
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Now the candidate equilibrium is to move to a pair of output (q∗
A,q∗
B)in the ﬁrst period.
Suppose we start with initial vector q0 ≪ q∗. Consider a unilateral deviation of ﬁrst moving
to some quantity qi q0
i < qi < q∗





















− s(qA + δq
∗
A).
The ﬁrm A will prefer not to deviate (and hence change production only once), if
V
∗ − V






A − P (qA + q
∗
B)qA + s(qA + (δ − 1)q
∗
A) ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the inverse demand should not react too drastically to the reduction of quantity.
In case of linear demand we have
(q
∗




B)) + s(qA + (δ − 1)q
∗
A) ≥ 0.
Clearly, the ﬁrst term is most likely to be negative, if qA → q∗




But this is just our demand function, the supremum of the argument is 3 times Cournot
quantity, so the inﬁnum of the function is exactly zero. Thus, the ﬁrst term is always positive.
The second term is positive, if qA > (1 − δ)q∗
A. Note though that at in the opposite case
(small quantities) the ﬁrst term becomes large: (δq∗
A)(a − b((2 − δ)q∗
A + q∗
B)). Taken at the
extreme, we have q∗
A (a − b(q∗
A + q∗
B)) + s((δ − 1)q∗
A) ≥ 0 meaning that frictionless Cournot
proﬁt should exceed switching costs, which is obviously satisﬁed if the market is to exhibit
any changes in quantities at all.
In eﬀect, with linear demand our candidate equilibrium brings larger value than deviation
2.
The fact that there exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium where the ﬁrms only move
once allow computation of the regions of initial allocations for which a ﬁrm will not change
its output in the same fashion as for the one-shot game. In fact, the shape of these regions
2It is standard to show that the same is true for a deviation in any other period and for deviations in
multiple periods.
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turns out to be very similar, except that the set is smaller, but not empty for δ > 0. For
δ = 1 obviously this set is empty and the only Markov perfect equilibrium is the Cournot
equilibrium of the frictionless game.
For any 0 < δ < 1 analysis similar to the one-shot game above can be performed to ﬁnd
both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, analogously as in the one-shot game.
Thus the qualitative results of the model persist when we extend the number of periods
to inﬁnity (even when we consider inﬁnitely many periods with the discount factor below 1)
and restrict ourselves to the simplest equilibrium concept consistent with rational behavior
in an inﬁnitely repeated game setting.
7. Discussion of the results
The simple Cournot model of this paper shows that in the presence of switching costs
equilibrium allocation depends on the initial allocation. The initial allocation in this model
can be interpreted as the ﬁrms’ market shares relative to potential demand. Thus, initial
allocations close to the origin of the graph correspond to situations where the market has
signiﬁcant potential for growth, and the allocations where both ﬁrms have large initial sales
corresponds to a situation in which market is shrinking. In this view a sudden shock, say
increase in expected market size, could induce a change in relative market shares if it is
large enough. This response could lead to a reversal in the order of market share sizes. One
implication of the model is that the adjustment to shocks in demand is hard to predict and
may involve sudden shifts in market positions of the ﬁrms. Industries exhibiting persistent
asymmetries in market shares, periods of relatively stable division of market followed by
sudden readjustments or longer periods of symmetric market division would all be consistent
with the presence of switching costs and imperfect diﬀerentiation between old and new
customers, as in the model.
Entry decision can be analyzed. In new industries with a large growth potential the
model would predict a relatively symmetric market shares after the entry, as the entrant
holds large sales upon entry and the incumbent does not ﬁght aggressively for a market
share. At the other extreme an entry to a shrinking monopolized market would result in
a relatively asymmetric market allocation, despite the fact that the incumbent is even less
aggressive in such a case.
Recently a theory of the stepping stones, or the ladder of investment theory, has become
prominent in the literature and among regulators of some industries (telecommunication)
where the cost of initial investment into infrastructure are high. The idea of the ladder of
investment is that an entrant be given access to the infrastructure of the incumbent so he
can build a customer base, which would then justify investment in own infrastructure. If




the access to infrastructure is limited so that initially the entrant can not supply the whole
market the model predicts that it could easily happen that after the entrant has captured a
signiﬁcant customers base it may lose the incentive to increase sales further and with it the
incentive to invest in own infrastructure, thus defeating the purpose of the ladder idea. The
entrant would invest in large infrastructure capacity in the absence of the ladder, but after
capturing a signiﬁcant customer base it may no longer be optimal for it to build his own
infrastructure.
8. Conclusion
Our The analysis in this paper is centered around one basic feature of reality: history
dependence. In the simple Cournot setup history matters because the customers have to
incur switching costs whenever they buy from a new seller. Equilibrium of Cournot game
for any initial allocation of sales is characterized. The main ﬁnding is persisting asymmetry
in market shares of otherwise identical ﬁrms. This result survives extending the model to
multiple periods, including an inﬁnitely repeated game.
I also show that when initial asymmetries are small, they tend to remain small, as none
of the ﬁrms is motivated to behave aggressively. When initial asymmetries are large, the
smaller ﬁrm has an incentive to expand, and sometimes it does so to the extent that it takes
more than half of the market. This gives us empirically testable hypotheses of stable market
shares in the markets with uniform distribution of market shares and high volatility in the
markets with very uneven distribution of market shares.
The model also provides rationale for a large-scale one-time entry versus gradual buildup
of capacities. The intuition remains intact: with switching costs a fresh entrant is the one
who has ”nothing to lose”and is relatively more aggressive than a seller with an established
customer base.
Linear demand and homogeneous good framework are the main limitations of the model.
However, diﬀerent demand functions do not change the nature of competition, so we do not
expect our qualitative results to be altered signiﬁcantly. Heterogeneous goods framework
would be an interesting extension to our analysis, adding new channels for switching costs
to work through. At the same time, the main eﬀects of customer lock-in outlined here will
remain on its place.
The analysis presented is general and can be applied to any industries characterized by
switching costs. Telecommunications, banking, airlines are among classical examples of such
industries.
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Observations for Eﬀect of Fines
Art. Com..Dec. Raid Court Firm Fine.Com. Fine.Court Fine.Cap
1 82 1979/12/14 1983/06/07 Pioneer 0.30 0.20 0.00040
2 81 1980/11/25 Johnson & Johnson Inc. 0.20 0.00005
3 82 1981/12/17 1983/11/08 Siemens 0.04 0.04 0.00001
4 82 1985/12/14 1991/07/03 AKZO 10.00 7.50 0.04548
5 82 1985/12/18 Fanuc 1.00 0.00013
6 82 1985/12/18 Siemens 1.00 0.00007
7 81 1986/04/23 1983/10/13 1991/12/17 BASF 2.50 2.12 0.00035
8 81 1986/04/23 1983/10/13 1992/03/10 Hoechst 9.00 9.00 0.00128
9 81 1986/04/23 1983/10/13 1992/03/10 Shell 9.00 8.10 0.00025
10 81 1986/04/23 1983/10/13 1999/07/08 Imperial Chemical 10.00 9.00
11 81 1986/04/23 1983/10/13 1992/03/10 Solvay 2.50 2.50 0.00170
12 82 1987/07/10 1990/02/08 Beiersdorf 0.01 0.01 0.00001
13 82 1988/12/05 1986/08/21 1993/04/01 BPB Industries 0.15 0.15 0.00009
14 81 1994/07/27 1990/06/19 Norsk Hydro 0.75 0.00025
15 81 1994/07/27 Solvay 3.50 0.00152
16 81 1994/07/27 1992/02/27 BASF 1.50 0.00 0.00021
17 81 1994/07/27 1992/02/27 Hoechst 1.50 0.00
18 81 1994/07/27 1992/02/27 Imperial Chemical 2.50 0.00
19 81 1994/07/27 1992/02/27 Shell 0.80 0.00
20 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 BASF 5.50 0.00
21 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 Bayer 2.50 0.00 0.00029
22 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 Dow Chemical 2.25 0.00 0.00017
23 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 Hoechst 1.00 0.00 0.00013
24 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 Imperial Chemical 3.50 0.00
25 81 1988/12/21 1983/11/21 1995/04/06 Shell 0.85 0.00 0.00002
26 82 1989/12/13 1991/06/29 Bayer 0.50 0.50 0.00006
27 81 1990/12/19 1995/06/29 Solvay 7.00 0.00 0.00362
28 81 1990/12/19 1995/06/29 Imperial Chemical 7.00 0.00
29 83 1992/04/01 Nedlloyd 0.03
30 82 1992/07/15 1989/09/19 1994/07/14 Herlitz 0.04 0.04 0.00008
31 81 1994/07/13 1991/04/23 1998/05/14 SCA Holding 2.20 2.20 0.00265
32 81 1994/12/21 2002/02/28 Kisen Kaisha 0.01 0.00 0.00001
33 81 1994/12/21 2002/02/28 Mitsui OSK Lines 0.01 0.00 0.00000
34 81 1994/12/21 2002/02/28 Neptune Orient 0.01 0.00 0.00001
35 81 1994/12/21 2002/02/28 Nippon Yusen 0.01 0.00 0.00000
36 81 1994/12/21 2002/02/28 Orient Overseas 0.01 0.00 0.00004
37 82 1995/07/12 1991/06/26 1999/05/19 BASF 2.70 2.70 0.00026
38 82 1996/01/10 2000/10/26 Bayer 3.00 0.00 0.00020
39 82 1998/01/28 1995/10/23 2000/07/06 Volkswagen 102.00 90.00 0.00574
40 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 A.P. Moller-Maersk 27.50 0.00
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41 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 P & O Nedlloyd 41.26 0.00
42 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 Orient Overseas 20.63 0.00 0.12999
43 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 Neptune Orient 13.75 0.00 0.04494
44 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 Nippon Yusen 20.63 0.00 0.00641
45 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 Hanjin Shipping 20.63 0.00
46 83 1998/09/16 2003/09/30 Hyundai Merchant 18.56 0.00 0.08098
47 81 1998/10/14 1994/05/27 2001/07/12 Tate & Lyle 7.00 5.60 0.00354
48 81 1998/12/09 1994/07/05 2003/12/11 Minoan Lines 3.26 3.26 0.00697
49 82 1999/07/14 1997/06/12 2003/09/30 British Airways 6.80 6.80 0.00099
50 81 1999/12/08 1994/12/01 2004/07/08 Vallourec 8.10 8.10 0.02232
51 81 1999/12/08 1994/12/01 2004/07/08 Sumitomo Metal 13.50 10.94 0.00422
52 81 1999/12/08 1994/12/01 2004/07/08 Nippon Steel 13.50 10.94 0.00082
53 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Kawasaki Kisen 0.62 0.00 0.00059
54 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 A.P. Moller - Maersk 0.84 0.00
55 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Malaysia Shipping 0.13 0.00 0.00004
56 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Mitsui OSK 0.62 0.00 0.00022
57 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Neptune Orient 0.37 0.00 0.00017
58 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Nippon Yusen 0.62 0.00 0.00011
59 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Orient Overseas 0.13 0.00 0.00045
60 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 P & O Nedlloyd 1.24 0.00
61 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Evergreen Marine 0.37 0.00 0.00020
62 81 2000/05/16 2003/03/19 Hanjin Shipping 0.62 0.00 0.00249
63 81 2000/06/07 1997/06/11 2003/07/09 Archer Daniels 47.30 43.88 0.00760
64 81 2000/06/07 1997/06/11 Ajinomoto 28.30 0.00338
65 81 2000/06/07 1997/06/11 2003/07/09 Kyowa Hakko 13.20 13.20 0.00303
66 81 2000/06/07 1997/06/11 2003/07/09 Daesang 8.90 7.13 0.05751
67 82 2000/09/20 1996/12/11 2003/10/21 General Motors 43.00 35.48 0.13213
68 82 2001/03/20 2006/01/26 Deutsche Post 24.00 24.00 0.00103
69 81 2001/12/05 2006/09/27 Archer Daniels 39.69 30.69 0.00344
70 81 2001/12/05 Bayer 14.22 0.00053
71 81 2001/12/05 Hoﬀman La Roche 63.50 0.00088
72 82 2001/06/20 2003/09/30 Michelin 19.76 19.76 0.00396
73 82 2001/06/29 2003/12/03 Volkswagen 30.96 0.00 0.00145
74 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 SGL Carbon 80.20 69.11 0.08649
75 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 Showa Denko 17.40 10.44 0.00714
76 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 Tokai Carbon 24.50 12.28 0.04873
77 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 Nippon Carbon 12.20 6.27 0.06620
78 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 SEC Corporation 12.20 6.14 0.12904
79 81 2001/07/18 1997/06/05 2004/04/29 Carbide Graphite 10.30 6.48
80 81 2001/07/18 2000/06/15 SAS 39.38 0.04771
81 82 2001/07/25 1997/06/05 Deutsche Post 0.00 0.00000
82 82 2001/10/10 1996/12/11 2005/09/15 DaimlerChrysler 71.83 9.80 0.00185
83 81 2001/11/21 2006/03/15 BASF 296.16 236.85 0.01127
84 81 2001/11/21 Aventis 5.04 0.00008
85 81 2001/11/21 Takeda Chemical 37.06 0.00080
86 81 2001/11/21 Merck 9.24 0.00171
87 81 2001/11/21 2006/03/15 Daiichi Pharm 23.40 18.00 0.00255
88 81 2001/11/21 Lonza 0.00 0.00000
89 81 2001/11/21 Solvay 9.10 0.00179
90 81 2001/11/21 Eisai 13.23 0.00154
91 81 2001/11/21 Sumitomo 0.00 0.00000
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92 81 2001/11/21 Tanabe Seiyaku 0.00 0.00000
93 81 2001/11/21 Roche 462.00 0.00637
94 81 2001/12/05 1999/07/13 2005/10/25 Danone 44.04 43.22 0.00228
95 81 2001/12/11 1999/02/16 2006/09/27 Commerzbank 28.00 0.00 0.00272
96 81 2001/12/11 1999/02/16 2006/09/27 Dresdner Bank 28.00 0.00 0.00123
97 81 2001/12/11 1999/02/16 2006/09/27 Bayerische Hypo 28.00 0.00 0.00117
98 81 2002/06/11 2006/12/14 Erste Bank 37.69 37.69 0.00985
99 81 2002/07/02 1999/06/16 Aventis 0.00 0.00000
100 81 2002/07/02 1999/06/16 2006/04/05 Degussa 118.12 91.12 0.01584
101 81 2002/07/02 1999/06/16 Nippon Soda 9.00 0.02837
102 81 2002/07/24 1997/12/11 Air Liquide 3.64 0.00028
103 81 2002/07/24 1997/12/11 Air Products 2.73 0.00027
104 81 2002/07/24 1997/12/11 BOC Group 1.17 0.00018
105 81 2002/07/24 1997/12/11 Linde 12.60 0.00228
106 82 2002/10/30 Nintendo 149.13 0.01105
107 81 2002/10/30 Christie 0.00 0.00000
108 81 2002/10/30 Sotheby 20.40 0.05831
109 81 2002/11/27 1998/11/25 Pending Lafarge 249.60 0.02399
110 81 2002/11/27 1998/11/25 Pending BPB 138.60 0.06790
111 81 2002/11/27 2001/01/15 Aventis group 2.85 0.00006
112 81 2002/11/27 2001/01/15 Merck 0.00 0.00000
113 82 2003/05/21 Pending Deutsche Telekom 12.60 0.00025
114 82 2003/07/16 Yamaha 2.56 0.00095
115 81 2003/10/01 Pending Hoechst 99.00 0.00476
116 81 2003/12/03 Pending Carbone Lorraine 43.05 0.12892
117 81 2003/12/03 Pending SGL Carbon 23.64 0.08190
118 81 2003/12/10 Akzo 0.00 0.00000
119 81 2003/12/10 2005/11/22 Degussa 16.73 16.73 0.00314
120 81 2003/12/10 No appeal Atoﬁna 43.47 0.00048
121 81 2003/12/16 2003/03/22 Pending Outokumpu 18.13 0.00994
122 81 2003/12/16 2003/03/22 KME 18.99 0.08366
123 82 2004/03/24 Pending Microsoft 497.20 0.00230
124 82 2004/05/26 Topps 1.59 0.00551
125 81 2004/09/03 2001/03/22 Pending KME 32.75 0.22473
126 81 2004/09/03 2001/03/22 Pending Outokumpu 36.14 0.01523
127 81 2004/09/03 2001/03/22 Pending Halcor 9.16 0.05336
128 81 2004/09/29 2000/01/25 Danone 1.50 0.00009
129 81 2004/09/29 2000/01/25 Heineken 1.00 0.00008
130 82 2005/06/15 2000/02/09 Pending AstraZeneca 14.00 0.00026
131 81 2004/12/09 Pending AKZO 20.99 0.00233
132 81 2004/12/09 Pending BASF 34.97 0.00124
133 81 2004/12/09 Pending UCB 10.38 0.00180
134 82 2005/10/05 1999/09/22 Pending Peugeot 49.50 0.00354
135 81 1984/11/23 1980/12/09 Solvay 3.00 0.00457
136 81 1984/11/23 1980/12/09 Degussa 3.00 0.00349
137 81 1984/11/23 1980/12/09 Air Liquide 0.50 0.00026
138 81 1992/07/15 Toshiba 2.00 0.00017
139 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Dyckerhoﬀ 13.28 8.04 0.01445
140 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Heidelberger 15.65 7.06
141 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Ciments Francais 25.77 13.57 0.04221
142 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Lafarge 23.90 15.28 0.00470
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143 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Titan Cement 5.62 0.00 0.02259
144 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Buzzi Unicem 3.65 0.00 0.01310
145 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Cementir-Cement 8.25 7.47
146 81 1994/11/30 2000/03/15 Italcementi 33.58 26.79
147 81 1998/01/21 2001/12/13 Acerinox 3.53 3.14
148 81 1998/01/21 2001/12/13 Thyssenkrupp 8.10 4.03
Table A.1: List of observations
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